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Summary 
 
This dissertation’s primary focus is why torture is used when torture is not an effective means 
of gathering intelligence. To answer this question the argument for the use of torture, 
commonly known as the ticking time bomb argument, is discussed. Due to psychological and 
physiological processes during torture interrogation it was found that torture cannot be relied 
upon to deliver truthful information. Torture was also found to adversely affect the 
institutions that are needed for its establishment.   
 
After torture has been found to be of no utility in terms of the appropriation of information the 
question of why torture is still used is answered by means of discussing societal dynamics as 
well as the political process surrounding torture. On the societal front it was found that 
American public opinion towards torture is ambivalent. The reason for this includes a host of 
socio-psychological factors such as the in-group out-group bias as well the War on Terror as 
a political ideology in its own right. The notion that anybody is likely to torture is also 
explored by means of discussing the Milgram’s Obedience Experiment as well as the Stanford 
Prison Experiment.  
 
On the political front the notion that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay were the 
work of a few bad apples is dispelled since it formed part of a deliberative political process 
that tried to make torture a legitimate foreign policy measure. The reason for the existence of 
this process is the failure of international and domestic checks and balances. On the 
international front U.S. unilateralism as foreign policy principle is cited as the reason for the 
ineffectiveness of international measures to stop torture. On the domestic front the  permanent 
rally around the flag effect due to the permanent state of mobilization in the War on Terror is 
cited as the reason for the failure of domestic checks and balances. 
 
The lessons learnt from the research enables the creation of measures on how to stop torture 
even when it is found that the necessary political will is not present within the Obama 
administration. In the absence of political will it must be manufactured by means of the 
actions of civil society, the free press and the international community. It was found that the 
most effective means would be the creation of a committee of inquiry to create the political 
memory of the use of torture and how it was established. Additionally a memorial must be 
erected as well seeing that inquiries create political memories but they do not sustain it.   
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis se fokus is om na te vors waarom marteling gebruik word as dit nie ‘n effektiewe 
wyse is om inligting in te win nie. Om hierdie vraagstuk te beantwoord word die argument vir 
die gebruik van marteling naamlik die tikkende-tydbom-argument bespreek. Asgevolg van 
sielkundige en fisiologiese prosesse tydens ondervragings wat gebruik maak van marteling 
kan daar nie op marteling staatgemaak word om die waarheid op te lewer nie. Dit was ook 
bevind dat marteling die instansies, wat nodig is vir die gebruik daarvan, op ‘n negatiewe 
wyse beïnvloed. 
 
Nadat daar vasgestel is dat marteling geen nutswaarde aangaande die inwinning van 
informasie bied nie word die vraagstuk waarom marteling steeds gebruik word beantwoord. 
Op die samelewingsvlak kan daar gestel word dat die Amerikaanse samelewing onseker is oor 
of marteling gebruik moet word al dan nie. Verskeie redes vir hierdie opinie word aangevoer 
waarvan die in-group out-group bias en die Oorlog teen Terreur as politieke ideologie slegs 
twee daarvan uitmaak. Dat enige persoon in staat is tot marteling onder die regte stel 
omstandighede word ook bespreek na aanleiding van die Milgram’s Obedience Experiement 
en die Stanford Prison Experiment. 
 
Op die politiese vlak is daar vasgestel dat die menseregteskendings in Abu Ghraib en 
Guantanamo Bay nie die werk was van slegs `n paar indiwidue was nie, maar deel uitmaak 
van ‘n doelbewuste politiese proses wat marteling as ‘n legitieme buitelandse beleidskwessie 
wil afmaak. Die rede waarom die beleidsproses bestaan kan toegeskryf word aan die 
mislukking van inter- en intranasionale wigte en teenwigte. Op die internasionale vlak kan 
daar gestel word dat die Verenigde State se unilateralistiese modus operandi die rede is vir die 
mislukking van internasionale maatreëls teen marteling. Op die intranasionale front kan daar 
gestel word dat die Amerikaanse publiek verkeer in ‘n permanent rally around the flag-
toestand asgevolg van die permanent mobilisasie in die Oorlog teen Terreur. 
 
Uit die lesse wat geleer is uit die navorsing kan daadwerklike stappe gedoen word om die 
gebruik van marteling stop te sit alhoewel die Obama-administrasie se politiese wil ontbreek. 
Met die tekort aan politiese wil moet die politiese wil geskep word deur die burgerlik 
samelewing, the vrye pers asook die internasionale gemeenskap. Daar was gevind dat die 
mees effektiewe wyse om marteling stop te sit sal deurmiddel van ‘n kommissie van 
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ondersoek wees. Die kommissie se doel sal wees om te bepaal hoe marteling tot stand gekom 
het en ‘n politiese herinnering te skep. Daar moet ook ‘n bykomende maatreël wees, naamlik 
die oprigting van ‘n monument aangesien kommissies van ondersoek politiese herinneringe 
skep maar nie in stand hou nie. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Identification of the Research Theme 
 
Torture has been used as a method of punishment since ancient times. According to Swain the 
first instance of torture for informational purposes was in 1310 in England during the reign of 
King Edward II (Swain, 1965: 17). Seven hundred years later torture is still used worldwide 
with the torture in the detention camps in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib by the U.S. 
government being the most infamous and recent example.  
 
Torture is defined by the United Nations Torture Convention of 1984 as any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
With the exclusion of pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions (UN, 1984). For the purposes of the thesis it is important to distinguish between 
three types of torture that feature in the United Nations’ (UN) convention namely retributive, 
informational and torture for the sake of forcing confessions seeing that the thesis will focus 
exclusively on informational torture.  
 
To this day torture is still used extensively all over the world under the pretence that it’s an 
effective way of gathering intelligence. The use of torture has negative, society-wide 
implications that include jurisprudence (Bekerman, 2005) and how human rights are 
perceived (Waldron, 2005). The main hypothesis of the thesis is thus that torture is an 
ineffective means of gathering intelligence. By proving this hypothesis two main research 
questions flow from it.  
 
The first research question that the thesis aims to answer is why torture is still used so widely 
and extensively if it is inherently flawed? The assumption is that the use of torture is an 
emergent property of the interaction between social and political entities. 
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The second research question follows from the answers from the first question namely what 
steps can be taken within the social and political systems that will lead to the discontinuation 
of torture? Seeing that international monitoring mainly led to the shift from scarring 
techniques to clean techniques and not to discontinuation of torture (Rejali, 2007: xviii) the 
answer will be more complex than merely imploring good global citizenship from states.   
   
 
1.2 Significance of the Research Theme 
 
In 2009 the Obama administration declassified documents that outline the flawed legal 
process that eventually lead to the use of torture in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib (Stein, 
2009). The timely declassification of these documents is especially advantageous for the 
thesis seeing that this case is very well known, illustrative and are unmatched by any other 
report with reference to detail, accuracy and proximity to the source. The timing of the release 
will also guarantee that the thesis will be one of the first full-length academic texts that make 
use of these documents. The use of torture by the U.S. government during the War on Terror 
will therefore serve as the case study.  
 
Apart from the topical nature of the thesis the author also regards the research significant 
because of the wide impact that the use of torture has. Examples include the loss of moral 
standing of states that partake in the practice as well as how human rights are perceived by the 
general public when the use of torture becomes common knowledge  
 
 
1.3 Identification of the Research Problem 
 
The research problem can be divided into a hypothesis and two distinct but interrelated 
research questions. The hypothesis is that torture represents severe limited utility in terms of 
intelligence gathering as well as wider institutional problems such as jurisprudence, the 
participation of doctors and the emotional toll it takes on torturers  
 
After the hypothesis is proven two questions remain unanswered. The first will be why torture 
is still used so extensively despite the limited utility of the practice, democratic decision 
making and international conventions against torture? Preliminary research states that the 
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security situation, properties unique to torture and how it relates to institutional structure are 
important factors.  
 
After answering the first research question the necessary information will be at the writer’s 
disposal to make institutional recommendations that will halt the spread of torture if 
implemented correctly and answer the second research question of how torture can be halted.      
 
 
1.4 Demarcation of the Study 
 
The research will primarily focus on the use of torture by the American military during the 
War on Terror which started after the 11th of September 2001 until 2009 although other more 
historic examples will also be used especially pertaining to the hypothesis. The relationship 
between the attributes of torture, the American intelligence service, political decision making 
and society will be focused on during the answering of the two research question. The second 
research question will especially focus on political institutions and torture. 
 
It must also be stated that the torture debate in the U.S. is an ongoing affair. This makes a 
retrospective analysis of events pertaining to the case study impossible. This study is therefore 
demarcated to the use of torture by the U.S. government from the 11th of September 2001 
until the declassification of a set of documents on the 24th of August 2009. 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the U.S. government’s use of torture and the secrecy 
surrounding it some of the declassified documents are not declassified in their totality. In 
certain aspect the study is therefore demarcated by default to the informational limits of the 
abovementioned documents.   
 
 
1.5 Literature Survey 
 
Rejali has written extensively on the proliferation of torture techniques throughout the world 
as well as the use of clean techniques instead of techniques that leave permanent physical 
marks to thwart the attempts of international monitors (Rejali, 2007). There has also been 
journalistic enquiries into episodes of torture in Israel in 1988, Northern Ireland in 1971 
(Conroy, 2000) in South Africa during Apartheid (Pauw, 1997) and comparative work 
between South Africa and Argentina (Gravil & Merret, 1991).  
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Recently, under the auspices of the American Centre for Strategic Intelligence Research, the 
Intelligence Science Board has started with a cross-disciplinary study of educing information. 
This body of literature focuses on ways of reliably and effectively eliciting information from 
detainees by other means than torture (Centre for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2006). The 
mere existence of this research already hints to the fact that previous techniques, that include 
torture, are not perceived as being effective. 
 
The meaning of the term torture has also attracted attention, how it’s defined and interpreted 
between different legal systems (Bekerman, 2005) and how a loosely-worded UN definition 
has led to human rights violations (Koryagin, 1988) pose as examples. Seidman proposes that 
despite problematic definitions the physicality of torture disallows the public and government 
institutions to readily explore why torture exists and proliferates (Seidman, 2005). Attempts to 
narrow the judicial definition of torture is seen by Waldron as a possible archetype for further 
jurisdiction that will damage the rule of law in the USA and how human rights are perceived 
(Waldron, 2005). According to Nicole a better understanding of the term and international 
awareness of torture hinges on dialogue with victims and torturers (Nicole, 1987). Shue 
moves away from the definition of torture and denounces torture on philosophical grounds 
(Shue, 1978).  
 
Sociological research by Hooks and Mosher state that the recent human rights atrocities in 
Abu Ghraib does not follow out of the simplistic rationalization of a few bad apples but rather 
US security concerns that place information above human rights concerns. According to them 
the system that rationalizes violence is the reason why torture has come to be a systemic 
property of the US military (Hooks & Mosher, 2005). From the field of psychology various 
sources have denounced torture or has given explanations for certain parts of it’s proliferation 
like obedience to authority in the famous Milgram’s Obedience Experiment (Milgram, 1963) 
and the notion of cultural tilt (on how bystanders accept and even take part in a violent 
system) (Staub, 1989). Zimbardo’s book The Lucifer Effect also sheds light on prisoner and 
prison guard/warden relations, how adversely skewed power relations can lead to the 
dehumanization of prisoners and the comparison to the Stanford Prison Experiment and the 
Abu Ghraib detention centre (Zimbardo, 2007)   
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Arrigo classifies the justifications for torture in four separate models namely the animal 
instinct model, the cognitive failure model and the data processing model and the rogue model 
of truth telling. The animal instinct model states that the suspect will provide the necessary 
truthful information under threat of death or severe pain. The cognitive failure model states 
that a suspect will provide truthful information as soon as the suspect becomes disorientated 
enough by pain and the cognitive defences break down. The data processing model uses a 
dragnet approach that relies on interrogating a vast amount of suspects and then creating a 
plausible flow of events afterwards. The rogue model of torture relies on the outsourcing of 
torture to other national intelligence agencies. She dispels the utility of all these approaches 
based on an institutional input and output model (Arrigo, 2004: 456). Game theory has also 
been applied to torture to explore the rationale where torture is used by the state for 
informational purposes or those of intimidation. The situation is seen as one where the 
torturer, detainee and state interact in an environment of incomplete information and from this 
model it’s deduced that a culture of strong victims is the only way in which torture for 
informational purposes will stop (Healy & Wantchekon, 1999). 
 
Although all of these sources give significant insight towards the subject of torture they all 
share an unintegrated approach meaning that all the sources focus on small segments of a 
bigger puzzle. The reason for this is probably the cross-disciplinary nature of torture. Another 
problem is that the research is not juxtaposed against a real-life, irrefutable case study. The 
reason for this is that no real case study, with such a wealth of information, has ever existed 
before the Obama administration decided to declassify documents relating to the U.S. use of 
torture. With the benefit of the aforementioned research on torture and the declassified 
documents this dissertation stands in good stead to deliver a worthy contribution to the debate 
on the use of torture.    
 
 
1.6 Methodological Aspects  
 
Although policy recommendations have been made by various human rights organizations 
and different authors none have employed systems theory to this task. The advantage of 
systems theory is that it provides a holistic view of the enabling circumstances of torture and 
its proliferation. It therefore affords a more dynamic view of torture than previous reductionist 
approaches and sees torture as an emergent property of institutions and political decision. 
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Another advantage of this approach is that it identifies leverage points. Leverage points are 
points in a system where changes can be brought about that have the maximum impact with 
the least amount of change to the system as a whole (Jackson, 2003:68). This dissertation will 
therefore deliver policy recommendations that are based on a more dynamic model that 
focuses on torture while taking into account the interrelation between torture, institutions, 
political decision making and torture.   
 
 
The methodology that will be followed will be that of the systematic literature review with a 
qualitative approach to the information. Although micro-levels of analysis will be discussed 
e.g. the interpersonal nature of torture between victim and torturer as well as the possible 
society-wide, macro-level, implications of torture the main focus will fall on the meso-level 
institutional characteristics seeing that the focus will be on ways in which institutions can 
guard themselves against deciding on the use of torture. 
 
The goal of this methodology is a thesis that combines theoretical experts from conflict 
studies, social psychology, law and policy studies and applies it to journalistic accounts and 
declassified documents, that pertains to the torture during the U.S. War on Terror, in a 
systemic fashion that will lead to suggestions to enable institutional and societal change to 
halt the use of torture.    
 
 
1.7 Theoretical Aspects 
 
Theoretical difficulties relating to torture can be partially attributed to the covert nature of 
torture. Torture’s covert nature causes information of an episode or related episodes of torture 
to be kept secret or to be incrementally declassified on a later date. As of yet no set of modern 
episodes of torture have ever been declassified in full. This means that no body of theory has 
ever been built around an undisputed case study and repeated or refined on another case 
study. 
 
Another theoretical problem is that torture does not form part of one field of academic enquiry 
and scholars rarely attempt to work outside of their chosen academic fields. Torture could be 
said to have historic, social-psychological, medical, political, policy and conflict aspects. This 
inherent cross-disciplinary nature of torture and the unwillingness of scholars to work outside 
of their chosen field arrests the development of a unified body of theory on the subject.     
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1.8 Conceptual Aspects 
 
The most important conceptual aspect is the use of the concept torture. The reason for this is 
that within the case study the U.S. Government’s Office of Legal Council tried to make 
torture a legitimate foreign policy option by means of reinterpreting the U.N. definition of 
what torture is.  
 
   
1.9 Structure of the Study and Outline 
 
Chapter 1 serves as introduction to the study by stipulating exactly what the study will 
address. This is done by means of illustrating the uniqueness and significance of the study in 
relation to previous academic works on the subject of torture. In addition to a discussion on 
the methodological and theoretical aspects brief chapter outlines are also provided.  
 
Chapter 2 will discuss the limited utility of torture. The express purpose of this chapter is to 
prove the hypothesis that torture is an unreliable way to gather intelligence and undermines 
the practice of effective intelligence gathering techniques. This will be done by means of a 
systemic literature review that introduces the shortcomings of the much sited ticking time 
bomb argument for torture and juxtaposes it with a host of practical reasons of why torture 
will not work. In addition the different institutional tolls that the use of torture takes will be 
discussed with a vast array of examples which includes democracy.  
 
Chapter 3 forms part of the systemic model of torture and illustrates how society delivers two 
vital inputs to the torture process namely consent and torturers. The use of torture by the U.S. 
government is used as case study. Societal consent will be illustrated by examining the 
American public’s opinion on torture as well as social-psychological reasons why the 
American public hold these views surrounding torture. One of them will be the War on Terror 
as political ideology. This discussion will be followed by an examination of the various 
linkages between public opinion and governmental policy (that will be discussed during the 
following chapter). After this examination the focus shifts to the question of how society 
supplies torturers and will be demonstrated by means of the Milgram’s Obedience Experiment 
and the Stanford Prison Experiment which where conducted under the auspices of Yale 
8 
 
University and Stanford University  and authored by Stanley Milgram and Phillip Zimbardo 
respectively. 
 
Since chapter 3 has illustrated the power of circumstance and how it can influence human 
behaviour Chapter 4 focuses on how the U.S. government succeeded in creating these 
circumstances by making torture part of their foreign policy. A host of different factors will 
be looked at to explain this policy phenomenon including the American history of torture and 
the impact of the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September 2001 (commonly referred to as 
9/11). The policy process and how the U.S. Justice Department tried to make torture a 
legitimate foreign policy option by means of the Geneva Convention of 1949, overriding 
presidential power, the definition of torture, torture techniques and bypassing Congressional 
oversight mechanisms. This attempt would also not have been possible if the inter- national 
and domestic checks and balances on abusive behaviour did not fail. From the international 
point of view the reasons for the U.S. tendency to wield power unilaterally will be explored. 
From a domestic viewpoint the reasons for the failures of democratic checks and balances 
within the U.S. will also be investigated. 
 
Chapter 5 uses the lessons learnt from the previous two chapters to recommend ways in which 
torture can be stopped. Traditional approaches such as monitoring and legislation are 
examined as well as the recommendation of torture warrants. After these approaches have 
been discussed the level of political will to stop torture of the Obama administration is 
examined. In the likely event that the political will is lacking the systems model is used to 
explore approaches in which political will can be manufactured and the Church Committee of 
1975 is used as a historic example of this. Possible challenges to the creation of a commission 
are discussed and well as conditions for their inception as well as their social functions. An 
additional measure to stop torture namely memorials are discussed.   
 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
   
In this chapter the focus of the dissertation was discussed by means of the identifying the 
research theme. The hypothesis, that torture is an ineffective means of gathering intelligence, 
was identified in this section. From the hypothesis the research questions of why torture is 
still used and what can be done to stop it originated. This research theme is deemed to be 
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significant due to the declassified documents relating to the case study (that was demarcated 
as the use of torture by the U.S. government from after 11 September 2001 until 2009) that 
are at the author’s disposal as well as the wide impact of torture on states that partake in it.    
In addition to this a literature survey was done and it was found that the literature is not well 
integrated due to the cross-disciplinary nature of torture as subject matter. This lack of 
integration within the subject matter will be addressed by means of a methodology that makes 
use of the holistic view afforded by systems theory. The problem of a unified body of theory 
and problems relating to the concept of torture was also discussed before a structure and 
outline of the study was provided.  
 
When the research theme was identified it was mentioned that the hypothesis of the study was 
that torture is an ineffective means of gathering intelligence. The following chapter titled The 
Limited utility of Torture will prove this hypothesis correct by discussing the utilitarian 
argument for torture in the guise of the ticking time bomb argument, the practical 
ineffectiveness of torture as well as the negative effect of torture on a wide-ranging set of 
institutions. 
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Chapter 2 - The Limited Utility of Torture 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Any human interaction with a large enough difference in authority, has the potential of having 
torture as a property. It is therefore impossible to talk of the first instance of torture seeing 
that authority differentials are as old as human interaction itself. What could be said is that 
torture has been used for different purposes and that individual societies interact differently to 
torture according to the zeitgeist and security needs. Europe is a case in point where Victor 
Hugo wrote in 1874 that torture had ceased to exist but less than a century later torture was 
used by the British with regards to suspected members of paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland and the French during the Algerian War (Summerfield, 2003: 773).   
 
After the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks, when two passenger planes were flown into 
the Twin Towers, one plane into the Pentagon and another plane supposedly heading for the 
White House crashed after passenger intervention, the zeitgeist and security needs of the 
American society changed in such a manner that favourable circumstance for torture has been 
created. The American military openly used torture in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and other 
covert detention centres throughout the world in the belief that breaking the traditional 
prohibition on torture was a necessary evil at the start of what became known as the War on 
Terror. This belief stems from the assumption that torture is strategically effective and useful 
and provides the necessary actionable intelligence. 
 
This chapter challenges this assumption by firstly discussing the utilitarian argument for 
torture in the guise of the often cited ticking time bomb scenario. After the political 
philosophical argument has been made a more practical treatment of the subject will 
commence that questions the effectiveness of the practice in producing truthful information. 
In keeping with the holistic focus of the dissertation the wider institutional implications of 
torture will also be discussed in terms of the medical, judicial, intelligence gathering, societal 
and democratic institutions. In addition the effect of torture on torturers will also be reported. 
In the conclusion it is stated that the overwhelming evidence against this underlying 
assumption makes the use of torture a highly questionable practice and ends with asking why 
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it is still used if all evidence points to the fact that torture is morally repugnant, strategically 
ineffectual and downrightly dangerous. 
 
    
2.2 The Political Philosophy of Torture 
 
Torture can be used for several purposes: the ancient Mayans thought of torture as a rite of 
victory in battle; dictators use torture to instil fear by means of the terror that torture evokes; 
until two centuries ago the judiciary used torture as criminal punishment; the constabulary 
used it a means of extracting confessions. All the abovementioned purposes of torture are 
regarded by liberal democracies as an absolute taboo. Liberal democracies which by 
definition place a high regard on the sanctity of the individual and his/her rights would not 
allow the adverse cruelty of torture with the exception of torture for informational purposes. 
This allowance is mostly due to the hypothetical scenario of the ticking time bomb (Luban, 
2005: 1425-1436) that exists within a utilitarian moral framework. According to the 
Schlesinger Report on torture in Abu Ghraib this rationalization for torture is the most cited 
moral ground for the use of torture and cursory glances at any opinion piece on torture makes 
a mention of this argument (Luban, 2005: 1440). 
 
John Stuart Mill introduced the greatest happiness principle to utilitarian arguments. This 
states that the correct action in any situation is those that lead to the greatest amount of 
happiness and /or prevent the greatest amount of unhappiness. In the political realm this will 
mean that a policy maker will have to foresee the consequences of different policies and 
merely choose the policy that amounts to the greatest amount of happiness. The utilitarian 
argument for torture makes use of the ticking time bomb scenario where a terrorist has 
information pertaining to the location of a ticking time bomb in a crowded area that cannot be 
evacuated before the bomb detonates. It would then be permissible to torture the terrorist 
seeing that loss in utility, even in the case of death, would hopefully result in the safety of the 
targets of the time bomb. The death and/or severe bodily and psychological trauma of one 
individual are therefore rationalized on the grounds of the amount of lives that will be saved if 
the location of the bomb was known (Casebeer, 2003).  
 
A common critique of all utilitarian arguments in general is its consequentalist property that 
does not account for non-consequentalist elements such as human rights seeing that the 
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pursuit of happiness or the avoidance of unhappiness can lead to the use of individuals as 
means to an end (Haworth, 2004: 197-200). Consequentalism is also said to oversimplify 
complex moral situations to a mere cost-benefit analysis as Bernard Williams states in Luban 
(2005: 1444): Consequentalist rationality will have something to say even on the difference 
between massacring seven million, and massacring seven million and one.  
 
As stated beforehand the ideology of liberalism attaches great importance to the individual 
autonomy, dignity and liberty of all members of society and that these fundamental rights can 
only be withheld in case where individuals are impeding the rights of others. By means of the 
ticking time bomb argument torture can be used, in theory, to defend the liberties of the 
innocent. In practice the information gained from torture can only be said to be morally 
significant after torture has been done and if it fits with other previous assumptions and 
information to create a plausible but not necessarily true story. Even if the information were 
to be true one can only deduce the moral value of the information on a post facto basis. 
Torture is thus a moral lottery where the moral permissibility of the practice hinges on the 
questionable truthfulness of the information it provides (see the ineffectiveness of torture). 
Another practical consideration is that torture would only be effective if it were used on a 
wide array of subjects to gain a complete understanding of the threat. It therefore follows 
from this argument that the practical considerations of the ticking time bomb argument causes 
the use of torture to eventually lead to the widespread proliferation of human rights abuses, 
the very same rights it was said to protect in the first instance (Hilde, 2008: 1-4). 
 
Luban also shows that the ticking time bomb argument is very seductive in the sense that it 
will lead to any liberal to pronounce that torture might be of some use and makes the subject 
of torture open for debate. It also serves the unique argumentative function of separating 
torture from one of its mutually inclusive properties namely cruelty by bestowing the torturer 
with the image of a professional who dutifully does the morally repugnant task of torturing 
for the sake of the greater good. He goes further in his analysis to show that the ticking time 
bomb loses all credibility outside of the very narrow hypothetical confines set out by the 
argument (Luban, 2005: 1439-1444), as also illustrated by Casebeer.    
 
Casebeer makes use of Walzer’s notion of a supreme emergency, where it might be morally 
permissible to violate the rights of a person if an extreme emergency that threatens the 
existence of a nation state, community or culture is temporally and spatially imminent and 
13 
 
these violations take place in a last resort scenario (Casebeer, 2003). In theory it is therefore 
possible to foresee a situation where a person can be tortured for informational purposes that 
will end the supreme emergency but in practice the chances of this situation actually taking 
place is null due to the fact that no single threat of terrorism can create a supreme emergency. 
Even if no other alternative to torture exists then the usefulness of this approach hinges on the 
efficacy of torture to produce accurate information (Casebeer, 2003). This efficacy will now 
be investigated. 
 
 
2.3 The Practical Ineffectiveness of Torture 
 
Bennet, a senior army interrogator, in Janoff-Bulman (2007: 430) states that: Beyond the 
moral imperative, the competent interrogator avoids torture because it’s counter-productive 
and unreliable … In my two decades of experience as an interrogator, I know of no competent 
interrogator that would resort to torture. Not one. In Statement on Interrogation Practices 20 
former American army interrogators state that torture is counterproductive in The War on 
Terror. According to these interrogators, with over 200 years of experience, effective mission 
accomplishment and HUMINT (human intelligence) collection are impeded by torture seeing 
that torture and other forms of ill-treatment interferes with a skilled interrogators efforts to 
establish rapport (Bauer, 2006).    
 
Effective interrogation is done by trained interrogators who use the methods of social 
psychology to elicit information from detainees. For an interrogation to be successful the 
interrogator must take the needs, motives and self-perception of the detainee into account. The 
ticking time bomb scenario seems to have taken hold of the collective psyche and therefore 
torture seems to be the only answer at the cost of more thoughtful techniques (Janoff-Bulman: 
2007: 431).  
 
Other reasons why torture will not work are the mental processes of disassociation, attribution 
of meaning and purpose as well as conditioned safety signals (O’Mara, 2009: 5) during 
episodes of pain. Disassociation under extreme circumstances such as bodily trauma includes 
detachment from the situation, the minimization of pain perception and constricted 
consciousness. During one study 37% of patients who arrived at an emergency ward with 
severe injuries such as fractures or amputations did not report any pain for a sustained time 
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period amounting to hours in some instances (Rejali, 2007: 447) (Janoff-Bulman: 2007: 433). 
Mental escape therefore helps detainees to cope with the pain from torture.  
 
Attribution of purpose and meaning to pain and suffering is also another mental coping 
mechanism where the sensation of pain is made tolerable. Logic dictates that the person who 
would have the greatest amount of valuable information would also have the greatest resolve 
and add the most meaning to a certain political cause. The abovementioned mechanisms thus 
interact with pain and commitment in a positive feedback cycle that will not produce reliable 
information (Janoff-Bulman: 2007: 433). Other complications also include the fact that 
torturers are not able to calibrate the correct amount of pain for each individual because 
individuals have the same threshold for the sensing of a stimulus (sensation threshold) and the 
sensation of pain (pain perception threshold) but individual thresholds exists for when intense 
pain is felt (pain tolerance threshold) and conscious toleration of pain (encouraged pain 
threshold). At present no way exists on how to measure these different amounts of pain 
(Rejali, 2007: 449). It is therefore impossible for a torturer to administer just the right amount 
of pain, as torture folklore suggests, for extracting information from a detainee. This is the 
reason why torturers ask victims to indicate when they are ready to talk (Rejali, 2007: 453). 
 
Conditioned safety signals, conditioned behaviour that reduces pain, further affects the 
effectiveness of torture since the torturer wants to attain information from the detainee while 
the detainee wants to evade the physical pain and mental stress. In this situation the 
conditioned safety signal is talking seeing that the detainee is less likely to be tortured while 
talking. Whether the information is truthful or not is not important for the detainee because 
talking temporarily leads to respite from the stressful situation. The process of torture will 
therefore lead to plausible but confabulated information (O’Mara, 2009: 4).  
 
The condition safety signal of speaking for the sake of not being tortured instead of conveying 
the truth brings attention to the topic of reliable lie detection. The effectiveness of torture and 
the idea of the human lie-detector seem to fight for prominence in intelligence folklore. Rejali 
(2007: 464) cites a systematic literature review of all available sources which deal with 
deception detection. The success rate was judged to be only 57% and later research has 
whittled this figure down to 56.6%. Truth perception is stated to be 67% while an alarming 
rate of 44% has been said to be the limit of lie detection. Training does lead to more accurate 
lie detection with CIA interrogators having a success rate of 73%. Torturers do not have 
15 
 
access to this type of training and would therefore, on average, have less lie detection 
accuracy than the accuracy that can be gathered from merely flipping a coin (Rejali, 2007: 
464). 
 
Under situations of torture when the subject is willing to speak it might also happen that the 
subject has lost the ability to recall past events. This especially happens during electro torture 
and sleep deprivation that affects the hippocampus and prefrontal cortices since sleep is very 
important for the proper functioning of these two parts of the brain that control memory. 
Heightened and prolonged levels of stress associated with torture also affect the structural 
integrity of the hippocampus and prefrontal cortices due to sustained level of the stress 
hormone called cortisol (O’Mara, 2009: 2-3). Recent events are particularly prone to this 
phenomenon. According to the theory of Ribot’s gradient trauma to the brain affects the most 
recent memories first. This means that even if subjects are willing to talk the information has 
been tarnished by torture (Rejali, 2007: 467). In these instances where the subjects decided to 
share the necessary information it could be stated that the information could have been 
appropriated by other less invasive means such as rapport-based interrogation. 
 
Most torture interrogations go hand-in-hand with sleep deprivation and the repetition of 
questions. This technique is known as sweating this combination, even in the event of 
cooperative prisoners, can lead to confabulation due to the fact that it causes frontal lobe 
dysfunction (O’Mara, 2009: 3). Sleep deprivation has a comparative effect to alcoholic 
inebriation in that it heightens suggestibility and errors in judgment. The repetition of 
affirmative questions lead to the prisoner’s belief that the statements are true and combination 
with sleep depravation leads the detainee to believe that he actually has the information 
although the information is fictional. The plausible story that is then concocted between the 
interaction of torturer and detainee is also highly regarded because of circumstance and the 
detainee’s confident delivery (Rejali, 2007: 468-467). From this analysis it could therefore be 
stated that on physiological and neurobiological grounds the whole notion of extracting 
veridical information by inducing a sustained state of pain, stress and anxiety is not supported 
by medical science (O’Mara, 2009: 1).            
 
The notion that torture can be conducted in a professional manner is questionable. Rejali 
mentions two reasons. The first follows from the difference in pain perception between 
individuals and the inability to measure this. Torturers are therefore forced to inflict the 
16 
 
maximum amount of pain in the hope of breaking an individual. If this person does not break 
and all the allotted procedures have been tried torturers will move beyond regulations as in the 
case of Abu Ghraib. The other reason is that torturers are in competition with each other for 
advancement and prestige. This is most succinctly summed up in the following quote: Our 
problem is as follows: are you able to make this fellow talk? It’s a question of personal 
success. You see, you’re competing with the others. In the end your fists are ruined (Rejali, 
2007: 454). During the Battle of Algiers the use of torture became second nature for the 
French soldiers. Most notably a high ranking officer named General Paris de Bollardere, 
amongst others, resigned from the French army in protest of the wide proliferation and 
systemic use of torture (Rejali, 2007: 454-456). The protests had no effect and Worth reports 
that he had a conversation with a German member of the French Foreign Legion who matter-
of-factly spoke of the torture of prisoners (Werth, 1962: 30). This system of torture took top 
priority above other means of investigative techniques at the expense of the French 
counterinsurgency campaign. One particularly illustrative incident was when a locksmith in 
Algiers was tortured. He resisted the French torture and produced no information although he 
did have a piece of paper in his pocket that contained bomb blueprints and the address of a 
bomb factory in Algiers (Rejali, 2007: 486).  
 
 
2.3.1 Torture’s Institutional Requirements 
 
Apart from the abovementioned pitfalls of the consequentalist moral philosophy of torture it 
is also possible to denounce torture within this line of argument. Arrigo’s research on the 
limited utility of torture makes use of an utilitarian framework to pronounce that torture for 
informational purposes is an exercise in futility and that through organizational dynamics 
torture affects the function of institutions like the health care system, the judiciary, torturers, 
intelligence agencies and society at large (Arrigo, 2004: 562). Another insight is that various 
rationales, or combination of rationales, for torture lead to different institutional requirements 
and consequences (Arrigo, 2004: 544-546). These extra institutional requirements and 
negative externalities associated with the ticking time bomb scenario therefore makes even 
the act based utilitarian calculation for torture more complex than merely weighing the 
discomfort/life of one terrorist against those of innocent victims (Casebeer, 2003).  
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The animal instinct rationale states that under threat of death or the experience of severe pain 
will make the subject bend to the will of the torturer (Arrigo, 2004: 547). The institutional 
requirements for this rationale would be the active participation of medical professionals as 
advisers to the torturer. This will lead to considerable ethical problems and resistance from the 
health sector. The situational outcome hinges on the individual and therefore varied subject’s 
ability to deal with pain and provide accurate information under stressful conditions (Arrigo, 
2004: 547-548).  
 
The cognitive failure rationale assumes that by means of severe mental and physical 
disorientation the subject loses self-awareness and is no longer able to withstand the 
informational demands of the torturer. Compliance by means of disorientation requires 
biomedical research and the training of torturers. The CIA’s infamous MKULTRA project led 
to unethical research into brainwashing on unwitting subjects and the training of torturers, by 
necessity, leads to the dehumanization of the torturer (Arrigo, 2004: 550-554).  
 
The data processing rationale holds that the widespread interrogation of subjects will lead to 
enough information to accurately understand the scope of terrorist operations without 
necessarily interrogating the hard-line terrorists. This dragnet approach to information 
gathering requires almost impossible levels of coordination between agencies of torture, the 
police, judiciary, the government and military. The drawbacks of this rationale include the 
creation of immense amounts of data, both true and false, moral outrage against the torturers 
and creation of further resistance from terrorists (Arrigo, 2004: 554-559). Another factor 
associated with this approach is unnecessary torture, imprisonment and killing. During the 
Battle of Algiers the chief of the FLN, Saadi Yacef recruited 1,400 operatives. The dragnet 
approach of investigation followed by French General Massua led to the disappearance of 
3,024 Algerians as well as the imprisonment and likely torture of 22,600 other Algerians. This 
relates to the statistic that at least 15 innocent Algerians were tortured for every FLN member 
(Rejali, 2007: 482-483). 
 
In the rogue rationale for truth telling under torture, torture is outsourced to either foreign 
intelligence agencies, done secretly in government sponsored agencies or criminal groups. 
This approach has the benefit of torturing without necessarily dirtying the hands of state 
officials but it does cause other difficulties such as political indebtedness, harbouring of 
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criminal elements, and blackmail from torturers and validity of the interrogation (Arrigo, 
2004: 546 & 560-561). 
 
2.4.1.  The Medical & Psychological Professions 
 
Another negative externality is the compulsory presence of members of the medical 
profession during torture. Doctors take part in torture to assist the torturer in not killing the 
suspect. The presence of a medical professional also adds to the legitimacy of the practice in 
the view of the torturer (Kelman, 2005: 132). In the case of the War on Terror doctors take 
part in torture in two ways. Firstly, in 2002, the command of Guantanamo Bay created the 
Behavioural Science Consultant Team (BSCT) which includes doctors. Their responsibilities 
inter alia include planning interrogations, assessing techniques and the fitness of detainees for 
interrogation. This group of doctors were guided by the American Department of Defense’s 
new ethical guidelines, published in 2005, that makes no provision for torture and 
subordinates ethics to U.S. interpretations of applicable law and therefore disregards the risk 
of harm doing and violation of international standards (Sonntag, 2008: 168-169). These 
enabling factors leads to what Lifton in Sonntag (2008: 163) calls atrocity-producing 
situations defined as situations that are so structured, psychologically and military that 
ordinary people readily engage in atrocities. Secondly, in such circumstances doctors also get 
influenced by the property of dual loyalty where ethical considerations towards a patient are 
pitted against the interest of a state. If the doctor is not equipped with the necessary human 
rights knowledge or ethical compass these factors result in active participation in torture 
through the process of victim blame, moral disengagement or ideological totalitarianism. 
(Sonntag, 2008: 162-164).  
 
Active participation includes medical assessment and treatment of victims before and during 
torture with the goal of determining fitness for torture or the preparation of the victim for 
more torture and the falsification of medical reports to conceal torture. All of the 
abovementioned acts go against the UN Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), the Tokyo Protocol (Sonntag, 2008: 172) and 
the Hippocratic oath. The World Medical Organization has also banned any participation in 
torture from doctors. It then follows from this discussion that the participation of doctors in 
torture leads to various breaches in ethics concerned with the medical profession while the 
same can be said for other professions with a code of ethics and regulatory bodies like 
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journalism, psychology and law (Arrigo, 2004:548). With regards to journalism in Algeria 
and France during the Battle of Algeria the French government actively discouraged the 
publication of any material relating to the use of torture during the war. The editor of Editions 
de Minuit was even taken to court for this and the apparent publishing of dissertation 
propaganda (Werth, 1962: 30).      
 
 
2.4.2 The Judiciary 
 
The relaxation on the prohibition of torture albeit by means of torture warrants or narrowing 
the definition of torture to the point that certain methods are applicable to certain situations 
will result in a systemic corrupting effect of the judiciary (Waldron, 2005:1718) Waldron 
makes three distinct legal arguments against torture: 
 
Firstly, torture goes against the general spirit of Anglo-American law since this law system 
has a tradition of refuting the use of torture. Even though torture was once used in the law of 
proofs in the beginning of the nineteenth century torture began to be regarded by jurists, as 
described by Edward Peter, as the supreme enemy of jurisprudence and the greatest threat to 
law and reason that the nineteenth century could imagine (Waldron, 2005: 1719). 
 
Secondly, the juridical stance towards torture serves as what Waldron refers to as a legal 
archetype. This notion is based on the legal philosophical criticism of legal positivism that 
states that positivists seem to regard laws as a mere collection of rules at the expense of the 
fact that various provisions, precedents and doctrines hang together, adding up to a whole 
that is greater than the sum of its parts. According to the legal philosopher Dworkin the 
emergent features of a legal system that follows from the abovementioned interaction between 
provision, precedents and doctrines serve the purpose of illuminating gray areas in the law by 
means of conveying the whole underlying spirit or meaning of legal doctrine (Waldron, 2005: 
1721). Torture can therefore serve as a legal archetype defined as a particular provision in a 
system of norms which has a significance going beyond its immediate normative content, a 
significance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, 
principle, or policy of a whole area of law. Like a Dworkinian principle, the archetype 
performs a background function in a given legal system. But archetypes differ from 
Dworkinian principles and policies in that they also operate as foreground provisions. They 
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work in the foreground as rules or precedents, but in doing so, they sum up the spirit of a 
whole body of law that goes beyond what they might be thought to require on their own terms. 
The idea of an archetype, then, is the idea of a rule or positive law provision that operates not 
just on its own account, and does not just stand simply in a cumulative relation to other 
provisions, but operates also in a way that expresses or epitomizes the spirit of a whole 
structured area of doctrine, and does so vividly, effectively, and publicly, establishing the 
significance of that area for the entire legal enterprise (Waldron, 2005: 1723). Other legal 
archetypes include habeas corpus, the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment and the 
precedent set by Brown v. Board of Education (Waldron, 2005: 1724-1725).  
 
Just as habeas corpus is archetypical of legal notions regarding physical confinement torture 
will serve as an archetype for any legal notion regarding law and force examples of this 
include the Eighth Amendment on cruel and unusual punishment and laws resorting to 
procedural due process (Waldron, 2005: 1729-1734). 
 
Thirdly, the role of argument in legal practice is used to enforce the prohibition of torture. 
Argument is the primary means by which legal positions are enforced or changed. The 
success of a legal argument also hinges on how well it reverts to previous juridical practice 
because legal argument cannot function in isolation of the law. A relaxation of the prohibition 
on torture will lead to a whole new set of arguments relating to the use of force. The 
abovementioned role of argument as mode of change and legal archetype will therefore lead 
to unpredictable change in the juridical system. Waldron also laments the loss of continuity in 
juridical arguments against the unwieldy use of force that will emerge from the loss of torture 
as the argumentative tool that is used to illuminate the juridical system’s rejection of cruelty 
(Waldron, 2005: 1734 -1738). 
 
Apart from theoretical arguments against the use of torture other more practical arguments 
that relate to international laws and conventions can be made that are still relevant even if the 
prohibition of torture is relaxed locally. These arguments relate to extradition and war crimes. 
Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture of 1975 countries may refuse to hand a 
suspect over to another country if they suspect that the suspect might be tortured. This took 
place in 2006 when Britain refused to hand terrorism suspects over to the Algerian authorities 
based on the Algerian government’s inability to guarantee that the suspects won’t be tortured 
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(BBC, 2006). Those who torture in foreign countries under order also have no guarantees that 
they cannot be tried for war crimes (Coulam, 2006:14). 
 
 
2.4.3 Torturers 
 
Another criticism against the utilitarian ticking time bomb scenario is that it presupposes the 
existence of torturers. Although Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments has shown that 
ordinary people can torture, under specific authoritative circumstances, the proponents of the 
ticking time bomb scenario would have to admit that the importance of the information would 
call for someone trained in torture interrogation or has shown a propensity of extracting 
information. A practical example of this when a Military Intelligence officer in Abu Ghraib 
requested a commander to keep detainees awake and the commander refused on the grounds 
that my soldiers don’t know how to do it. And when you ask an eighteen-year-old kid to keep 
someone awake, and he doesn’t know how to do it, he’s going to get creative (Wolfendale, 
2006: 270). Torturers need the practical skill of inducing pain to gather information without 
killing the subject. It also requires the capacity to deal with the psychological stress associated 
with torture.  (Wolfendale, 2006: 270-273). As the American torture instructor in Uruguay, 
Dan Mitrione, states: You must cause only the damage that is strictly necessary, not a bit 
more. We must control our tempers in any case. You have to act with the efficiency and 
cleanliness of a surgeon and with the perfection of an artist (Rejali, 2007: 446). A common 
misconception is that torturers come from groups of people with sadistic tendencies. This is 
not the case. Although acts of torture have been committed by individuals for the sake of 
sadistic pleasure in some cases governments have sanctioned torture seeing that a deranged 
person who receives gratification primarily from feelings of power or from personally 
inflicting pain on others is usually too unreliable to be counted on by authorities to follow 
orders (Gibson, 1990: 78).   
 
The abovementioned skill and capacity must come from training seeing that it is difficult to 
imagine someone with the innate ability to torture effectively. Torturers usually come from 
elite military units such as the American Green Berets, the British SAS or the Greek ETA-
ESA. These units are renowned for their severe training practices (Wolfendale, 2006: 274). 
Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros created a model of how torturers are created by means of 
military training and is applicable to cases in Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Nazi Germany and 
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America (Gibson, 1990: 85-86). The model illustrates the three necessary elements. Firstly a 
screening process takes place with the purpose of identifying recruits with the necessary 
attributes for torture. Secondly social binding is created by means of initiation rites and elitist 
attitudes. Euphemisms for torture practices are used to create cognitive distance between the 
act itself and descriptions of it. The Greek ETA-ESA for instance used the term tea party to 
describe a beating with fists and a tea party with toast described a beating with clubs. Thirdly 
a set of procedures are set in place to guarantee obedience from the recruits. The procedures 
include: dehumanizing the victims; constant harassment with the purpose of suppressing 
logical thinking; rewards for obedience and punishment for disobedience and the gradual 
introduction of extreme violence to gradually change moral standing (Gibson, 1990: 83-84). 
Interrogation trainers that specialize in rapport-based techniques state that the most effective 
interrogators are open-minded, tolerant, creative, inquisitive, unregimented, extrovert and 
mentally flexible. The abovementioned units, with the goal of strict adherence to discipline 
and the unquestioning following of orders, do little to garner these individual characteristics 
(Arrigo & Bennett, 2007: 416).   
 
It is usually during the survival programs that the recruits are subjected to torture. One such 
program is the Survive, Evade, Resist, Escape (SERE) program presented at the John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This program includes a simulation of 
conditions in a prisoner of war camp (Wolfendale, 2006: 275). This program had been created 
to expose soldiers to torture methods used in the Korean War against American prisoners of 
war (Mazetti & Shane, 2009). During the British SAS training recruits are subjected to 48 
hours of interrogation. The interrogation includes the use of the infamous five techniques 
(blindfolding, stress positions, exposure to white noise, sleep depravation and deprivation of 
food and drink) that the British used in Ireland in 1971. According to the European 
Commission on Human Rights the five techniques are defined as torture techniques. The 
experience of being tortured leads to the desensitizing to the administering of pain to others 
(Wolfendale, 2006: 276).  
 
The training results in a case of unquestioning obedience to authority and in combination with 
the strict hierarchical structure of the military cases of torture are bound to fall outside the 
ticking time bomb scenario seeing that the guilt or innocence of the suspect is unrelated to the 
torturer applying his skills. Torture therefore ends in being a crime of obedience where acts of 
violence are done because of obedience to authority. It can therefore be stated that the type of 
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training needed to produce torturers will also lead to the type of obedient soldier that will 
torture under any circumstance and not only the ticking time bomb scenario (Wolfendale, 
2006: 283-286). This is especially true for the present American military seeing that career 
interrogators (individuals trained in language acquisition and rapport based interrogation 
measures and who denounce the use of torture) have limited career opportunities within the 
military (they can only achieve the position of warrant officers) or usually get reassigned as 
intelligence generalist. The strict hierarchy, a folk belief in the efficacy of torture the low rank 
of interrogators means that officers who make strategic or tactical decisions regarding 
interrogation has no formal training in this discipline. Therefore they are likely to order the 
use of torture (Arrigo & Bennet, 2007: 412).  
 
By allowing, condoning or giving of orders for torture the authorities are exposing torturers to 
a situation fraught with high personal expense, during and after the fact (Lippman, 1979: 36-
37). Some South African torturers have indicated that because of their work they even lost all 
enjoyment from sexual intercourse and their marriages have faltered because of this (Pauw, 
1997:63). This was also noted by an Algerian torturer who described the feeling of torture as 
an unique type of pleasure close to jouissance (pleasure with a sexual connotation) and 
anecdotal reports show that torture is also inherently addictive as illustrated by a French 
torturer in Algeria: I Realized that torture could also become a drug (Rejali, 2007: 485-486). 
Gibson also states that by exposure to and internalization of violence during training and 
actual violence creates the possibility of brutal behaviour even when not under orders (1990: 
86). Even after training the subjection of severe physical trauma is very stressful for the 
torturer as well and subsequently high levels of alcohol and drug abuse have been noted to 
under torturers (O’Mara, 2009: 2). 
 
 
2.4.4 Intelligence Gathering Institutions and the Military 
 
Another key institution that is also adversely affected by means of torture is the intelligence 
gathering institutes. Torture takes less time and effort than other measures such as 
interviewing, finger printing or surveillance and therefore gets used more at the cost of these, 
more reliable, techniques. The low quality and large amount of information acquired (see 
Arrigo’s data processing rationale – this chapter) leads to the reliance on more torture and 
further brutality and less proper investigatory techniques. Through this positive feedback 
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cycle torture as a tool becomes a crutch with the loss of skill from members of intelligence 
institutions as the side-effect (Rejali, 2007: 456-457).  
 
In the American case study the willingness to torture also made the intelligence gathering 
institutions and military vulnerable to wilful political influence. Testimony from the Senate 
Armed Services Committee shows that then-Vice President Dick Cheney and then-U.S. 
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tried to pressure the CIA to create a link between al-
Qaeda and Iraq. By means of torturing Ibn-al-Sheikh al-Libi, a Libyan member of al-Qaeda 
the CIA manufactured the evidence needed for the link between al-Qaeda and Iraq. This 
justification for the war in Iraq as part of The War on Terror proved to be a lie but by then the 
military was already in Iraq and the fabricated evidence indirectly led to more deaths than the 
9/11 attacks (Chomsky, 2009) (Macleod, 2009). 
 
    
2.4.5 Society 
 
By expanding on Arrigo’s argument one can also state that torture warrants the consent of the 
society that perpetrates it. In liberal democracies active participation is obviously not needed 
seeing that only inaction (a form of silent consent) will suffice. By means of systems theory it 
can be explained that use torture during times of national distress can lead to fundamental 
changes in the society that condones it. In a system the interaction of elements, within one 
layer, will lead to emergent properties which in turn will lead to changes in another layer of 
the system. This means that no acts are isolated and small changes can lead to drastic changes 
over time (Vallacher, 2007: 445-446).   
 
A relevant example would be a social-psychological system where the interaction between 
individual neurons that lead to cognition and sensation lead to thoughts and feelings (brain 
level) that lead to social judgments and values (mind level) which, when shared between 
individuals during interaction at the social groups and systems level, lead to inter alia 
normative beliefs, social judgments and political ideology. From this perspective it’s 
intelligible that a level wide change in any of the previous layers will eventually cause a 
change in the higher order beliefs and ideas (Vallacher, 2007: 446). 
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The introduction of torture is an instance that changes individual’s values toward issues such 
as human right’s, morality and responses to undesirable behaviour (Vallacher, 2007: 447). In 
Torture’s Truth Seidman also makes the case of the strong cognitive link that exists between 
the perceptions of the relationship between mind, body and torture (Seidman, 2005). Hilde 
affirms this most succinctly: …a society that institutionalizes torture is ultimately one that 
eats away at its individual and collective capacities to feel revulsion and shame in the face of 
cruelty towards and suffering of others. This result perhaps seems obvious, but it doesn’t 
arrive in obvious ways (2008:4). 
 
Thus far the case has been made for the social-psychological link between torture and the 
different pillars of a decent society but the additional property of national distress that comes 
with situations where the need for torture is felt has not been discussed. Vallacher states that 
these circumstances lead to higher temperature within the social-psychological system that 
strengthens the link of positive and negative feedback loops between levels and elements of 
the system. This means that societal stress or perception of a threat will be more pronounced, 
less linear and therefore very unpredictable. In addition to these circumstances the self-
correcting properties of the system are also tarnished because social groups and individuals 
tend to resort to any means, including torture, to stop the distress situation without due 
consideration (Vallacher, 2007: 447-448). 
 
 
2.4.6 Democracy 
 
Although democracies face threats from terrorist organizations the consequentalist nature of 
policy decision making may cause well-meaning policy makers to harm democratic 
institutions during decision making. This is especially true when uncertainty exist over 
conflicting outcomes within a high stakes environment where the need for action is pertinent 
(Mandel, 2005: 209 & 216). 
 
The American decision to torture did take place under these circumstances and it also did 
irrevocable damage to US democracy even though it solely intended to protect it by means of 
limiting the rights of prisoners. Mandel illustrates three ways in which this has happened. 
Firstly, torture, as a human rights violation, was condoned without measures to reinstate those 
rights. This goes against one of the pillars of democracy namely individual liberty. Secondly, 
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the limitation of rights will have to be offset by the effectiveness of the measure in protecting 
democracy (Mandel, 2005: 218). As this chapter has illustrated torture is not an effective 
means of producing intelligence and therefore the net effect of torture as policy measure is 
further damage to democracy. Thirdly, the public should be made aware of the purpose the 
rights limitations where the intent to protect democracy will carry more favour than the intent 
for revenge or outright malice. The horrendous pictures from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 
Bay illustrate malice and not the protection of democracy. Fourthly, where the moral 
principles that are held dear by the international community such as the Geneva Convention 
are flouted democracy is also tarnished (Mandel, 2005: 218).      
 
 
2.4.7 International Rule of Law 
 
Especially in the case of the U.S. and the powerful role it plays within the international 
community it could be stated that the use of torture could set a precedent that other states 
might follow. This signalling effect could have major implications with regards to the ways in 
which human rights laws are interpreted internationally (Echeverria, 2007: 2). Alberto 
Gonzales also shared this view in a 25 January 2002 memorandum to President Bush. He 
stated that by disregarding the Geneva Convention in the war in Afghanistan it invites other 
states in other conflicts to also seek legal loopholes to further disregard international laws 
such as the Geneva Convention (2002: 3). 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it was illustrated, with an interdisciplinary approach, how and why torture is 
not an effective means of extracting information. From the political philosophy torture was 
shown to be the rational choice but only within the narrow theoretical confines of the ticking 
time bomb argument. The argument was also shown to be a very seductive and dangerous 
one. Even if these highly unlikely and specific circumstances were met the rationalization for 
torture would hinge on the truthfulness of the information and the effectiveness of the 
techniques to produce it. It was shown that due to different individual’s psychological and 
physiological responses to pain and the proven inability of interrogators to detect lies the 
information from torture cannot be relied upon even in the event of cooperative detainees. 
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Torture apologists will obviously state cases where torture was effective but what is still 
indisputable is that torture does not exist in an institutional vacuum. The output of torture 
warrants certain institutional inputs from the field of medicine, the judiciary, torturers, 
intelligence agencies, society and democracy itself. These institutional inputs are different 
from other inputs seeing that they go together with far-reaching and unpredictable ethical, 
moral, personal and institutional expense. This argument was made to renounce the use of 
torture within its utilitarian framework.    
 
The Limited utility of Torture has proven that torture is not a worthwhile practice and that the 
effects of this practice is so far-reaching that it might even go as far as to detrimentally 
transform the ideological pillars of  the society, that it was supposed to protect in the first 
instance. This proof also raises the questions of why torture is still used even if it’s ineffectual 
and what can be done to stop its usage? These questions will be treated in the following 
chapters.     
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Chapter 3 – The Social Model of Torture 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Peters in Kelman (2005: 128) states that at the macro level torture is implemented as a policy 
instrument when there exists a perception of a threat to security, a security apparatus and a 
group is identified as an enemy. The threat to security, particularly the unconventional 
asymmetric type of threat exemplified by fundamentalist terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, 
leads to the justification of torture which then leads to authorization to torture. The reason for 
this is that the security apparatus is ill equipped to deal with such a threat by conventional 
means especially when low levels of actionable intelligence exists on these groups. The 
existence of a security apparatus enables the training of torturers as well as the creation and 
proliferation of torture techniques. The perception of this security threat coming from a 
certain group leads to the exclusion of these groups from state protection and the eventual 
dehumanization of the group and its members. These three macro conditions in combination 
with the social mechanisms of authorisation, routinisation and dehumanization therefore lead 
to the circumvention of democratic checks and balances and the implementation of torture as 
a policy instrument (Kelman, 2005: 134).  
 
Although Kelman’s insights outline the process it assumes the existence of authorisation 
routinisation and dehumanization without expanding on it and explaining the linkage between 
governmental action and societal consent as well as the underlying reasons for it. This makes 
these insights of limited use for the creation of an effective policy intervention.   
 
These shortcomings will be addressed in the following two chapters with this chapter 
focusing on American society. Society provides two vital inputs necessary for the systemic 
use of torture. In the American case consent, in the form of public opinion, and members of 
the security apparatus that are able and willing to torture are the inputs. This chapter will 
focus on the creation of a plausible systemic model of how American society could have 
produced these inputs by firstly exploring what the American public opinion towards torture 
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is. The identification of the ambivalent public opinion towards torture makes the identification 
of the underlying social-psychological reasons for the condonation of torture possible as well 
as the introduction of The War on Terror as political ideology. This section of the systemic 
model is concluded by investigating some plausible linkages between public opinion and 
governmental policy i.e. ways in which public sentiment is conveyed to policy makers. The 
following section focuses on how society supplies torturers by discussing the implications of 
The Milgram’s Obedience Experiment (by Stanley Milgram under the auspices of Yale 
University in 1963) and the Standford Prison Experiment (by Phillip Zimbardo under the 
auspices of Stanford University in 1971), two landmark experiments that illustrates changes 
in human behaviour with respect to authority and circumstances and gives insight into how 
these two factors can influence anybody into committing an act of torture. 
 
 
3.2  American Public Opinion Towards Torture 
 
It must be stated that torture is not a regular policy option such as income tax or welfare 
spending. The reason for this is that the decision was not made in a democratic context 
because no referendums were held and the Bush election campaign never categorically made 
torture a debatable policy option. It is therefore possible to hypothesize that American society 
had nothing to do with what would later happen in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. After 
the photos of the detainees in Abu Ghraib were published and the secret memos became 
public knowledge in America the torture of detainees shifted from the covert realm of 
intelligence to the open realm of public scrutiny. By means of this the American public 
became implicated in torture by their government. The American public could then have acted 
against torture but they chose not to. From the following discussion it can be seen that the 
American stance towards torture remained indecisive when it became public knowledge. 
 
3.2.1 Americans Support the Rights of Detainees in Principle 
 
In a July 2004 survey 88% of Americans showed support for the following statement on 
international detention laws: The US has signed a number of treaties establishing 
international laws governing how a country, in the context of armed conflict, must treat an 
individual it has detained (PIPA, 2004:3). The American public also expressed support for 
human rights of the non-conventional soldiers, such as terrorists, with a majority of 60% 
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(PIPA, 2004: 3-4). Approximately 68% of the American population stated that the American 
president should not have the power to disallow a court appearance in front of a neutral judge 
(PIPA, 2004:4-5). 
 
A majority of 66% stated that governments should never use physical torture. This answer 
was given after respondents were primed by the following statement: The US and most 
countries in the world have signed a number of conventions – that is, treaties that create 
international laws – that prohibit certain methods for trying to get information from detainees 
(PIPA, 2004:5). Nearly 33% found these laws too restrictive. This shows that 66% of 
Americans would favour a prohibition on torture if they were made to think through all the 
international laws and prohibitions and 33% reject these prohibitions. These results only 
pertain to physical torture. In the case of mental torture such as making the detainee believe 
that his/her family members will be killed a softer stance on the prohibition is favoured with 
55% for and 41% against. Only 52% supported a complete prohibition on and humiliating or 
degrading treatment and 44% found it too restrictive. In the case of threatening physical 
torture the public was split on 48%. When the pollsters asked respondents who felt that some 
prohibitions were too restrictive whether any of these types of torture could be done to 
American detainees by another country the highest support for any of the techniques was 19% 
for humiliating and degrading treatment (PIPA, 2004: 5).  
  
 
3.2.2 American Public Opinion and the Ticking Time Bomb 
 
The creation of four different security scenarios and pairing them with 14 different coercive 
techniques proved to be insightful. The four different scenarios were a combination of two 
different variables. The variables were modest or high consequences relating to the security 
situation and modest or high certainty of whether he actually had any useful information to 
his/her disposal (PIPA, 2004:8).  
 
The scenario of high consequence of and high certainty of information illustrated the 
seductiveness of the ticking time bomb argument (Chapter 2) seeing that it represents the 
scenario’s attributes. In the three other scenarios the only technique that got any majority 
support was sleep deprivation with support within the 55-65% range. For the ticking time 
bomb argument the support for sleep deprivation was 65%. This scenario also elicited 
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majority support for three other techniques namely hooding (56%), loud noises (56%) and 
stress positions (53%) (PIPA, 2004:8). These four techniques, with the exception of 
deprivation of food and drink, which had a 44% approval rate in the ticking time bomb 
scenario, constitute the infamous five techniques that were used by British soldiers against the 
IRA (Human Rights First, 2003). In 1978 in Ireland v. United Kingdom the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that these techniques, in combination, lead to intense physical and 
mental suffering and were geared for humiliation and breaking physical and moral resistance 
and should absolutely be prohibited (Human Rights First, 2003). This means that even if the 
American public supports the prohibition on the laws of torture it could be said that 
misinformation about what torture entails has led them to give support for four of the five 
techniques that is regarded by the European Human Rights Court as torture techniques 
(Human Rights First, 2003). 
 
 
3.2.3 The Relativity of Torture Opinion with Regards to Context 
 
The American public was specifically asked whether torture should be prohibited in cases 
specifically pertaining to terrorism based on different arguments for and against torture. On 
the basis that torture is morally wrong 75% supported the prohibition and on the basis that 
other countries might reciprocate the same percentage supported the prohibition. The same 
counts for the argument that uncertainty exists whether detainees are terrorists or would have 
useful information. 66% supported the argument that torture is not an effective means of 
getting information and other means should be sought (PIPA, 2004: 7).  
 
Despite the result that goes against torture public opinion is easily swayed by means of 
arguments for torture. This is indicative of the ambivalent American public opinion towards 
torture. Approximately 47% supported the argument that it would be immoral to necessarily 
prohibit the use of torture because the information pertained can save innocent lives. On the 
following statement: Given what we learnt from the September 11 attacks, we cannot afford 
to tie our hands declaring off limits any method for getting information that could be useful in 
the war on terrorism nearly 52% of respondents supported the use of torture. The same 
response was recorded for Terrorist groups obviously do not feel obliged to abide by 
international laws against torture and abuse. So the US should not feel obliged to always be 
limited by these laws when dealing with terrorists. An overwhelming majority of 63% gave 
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support to the following argument: Whenever possible, military interrogators should limit 
themselves to methods that are humane and consistent with international conventions. 
However, at times, military necessity may call for making exceptions to these rules (PIPA, 
2004: 7). It could therefore be said that the torture debate under the American public takes 
place in a context of ambivalence and that how the debate is framed sways public opinion 
even though prisoner’s rights are supported in principle.  
 
 
3.2.4 The Informational Dependency of Torture Opinion 
 
The American public was also unaware of the fact that senior members of staff did give 
permission for certain abuses. Knowledge of whether certain politicians gave permission 
correlated strongly with the opinion that they should be acquitted of their jobs. When 
individuals were asked whether Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, approved or 
disapproved of certain techniques only 35% were aware of the fact that he approved of 
making detainees go naked 45% knew of approval for hooding 55% knew of the approval for 
stress positions although knowledge of this approval correlated strongly with opinions of 
removing him from office (PIPA, 2004: 13). The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) estimates that less than 30% of the detainees at Abu Ghraib were actual terrorist or 
acted in a violent manner towards Iraqis. According to the American public 59% of detainees 
fit this description. Knowledge of the actual number correlated strongly with a loss of support 
for President George W. Bush during the next election (PIPA, 2004: 14). In theory the 
American public could have stopped torture by means of the delegate model of political 
communication (see section 3.4.4) if only they had educated themselves more on the relevant 
and available facts. 
 
Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment states that: For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act 
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
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capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions (United Nations, 1975). This is arguably the most important convention with 
regard to torture that America is a signatory to and with regard to non-conventional 
combatants and terrorists 60% of Americans feel that they should be treated in accordance 
with international treaties (PIPA, 2004: 4). This treaty in Article 2 also states that: No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture (United Nations, 1975). In section 3.2.2 of this chapter it can be seen that in the same 
survey Americans show majority support for certain coercive techniques under certain 
circumstances. This goes against the abovementioned UN Convention (which they showed 
support for with a 60% majority) (PIPA, 2004: 4 & 8).  
 
This dualism in the public opinion to torture can only be explained by asserting that the 
American public support these conventions in principle but have no idea of the practical 
implications or carry no knowledge of their contents although the correct information 
pertaining to torture will be able to influence the opinion with regards to torture towards an 
absolute prohibition.   
 
 
3.2.5 General American Ambivalence Towards the Use of Torture      
 
The latest research by the Pew Research center states that the American public has been 
ambivalent about the use of informational torture since July 2004. The April 2009 survey 
found that 49% of Americans felt that torture can be used often or sometimes while 47% felt 
that torture should rarely or never be used. In July 2004 43% of Americans felt that torture 
can be used often or sometimes while 53% felt it should never or rarely be used. This is one 
of only two instances during eight surveys spanning this time period that Americans who 
support torture or the prohibition of it have differed more than ten percentage points on the 
issue with the highest amount of support for the prohibition being 54% on January 2007 and 
the highest amount of support being 48% on February 2008 and November 2007 respectively 
(Pew Research Center, 2009:1-4). 
 
In the previous chapter mention was made that the perceived ease of torture in relation to 
finger printing, proper interviewing and surveillance will cause it to be used at the cost of 
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these more effective techniques (Rejali, 2006: 456-457). Arrigo’s data processing rational 
shows that the huge amount of low quality information will lead to more torture and even less 
quality intelligence (Arrigo, 2004: 554-559). Torture will therefore always be used in 
exponentially increasing capacities within intelligence gathering constitutions and cannot be 
used on a controlled basis. Americans who feel that torture can rarely be used are thus 
inadvertently supporting not only torture but it’s proliferation by means of the positive 
feedback loop inherent to torture. When seen from this perspective the 25% of Americans that 
feel that torture is never justified, in the April 2009 poll (Pew Research Center, 2009: 2), are 
in a severe minority. 
 
No policy maker can therefore take any specific cue from the public on whether to torture or 
not. This would mean that when the American government decided on torture as a policy 
option and when, with the leaking of the Abu Ghraib photos, the general public opinion was 
and is still too ambivalent to put an end to it. 
 
 
3.3 The Social-Psychological Reasons for Torture Support 
 
Rachlinski notes that how the public frames social problems leads to the demand for policy 
change. In the context of time, interest and informational constraints it’s possible that faulty 
biases and heuristics will influence public opinion as well as the subsequent demand for 
relevant policy and by extension how existing policy is viewed (2004: 547). What follows is a 
non-exhaustive discussion on possible, individual biases, fallacies, heuristics and ideologies 
that explain the general ambivalent attitude towards torture in American society in addressing 
the social issue of the threat presented by terrorism. 
 
   
3.3.1 In-Group Out-Group Bias 
 
Staub (1990: 52-53) explains that differentiation on an in-group out-group basis is one of the 
most basic human tendencies and can even be seen in infants. This seemingly genetic 
tendency is amplified by means of socialization where people learn to dislike others based on 
unfamiliarity and the like. Further exaggeration of this tendency takes place because it is a 
pleasurable experience to successfully associate with an in-group even if it is based on very 
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arbitrary measures. This in-group out-group distinction can in certain circumstances lead to 
discrimination and devaluation of the out-group. Devaluation might be present in the form of 
suspicion or dislike of the out-group. In more extreme circumstances it can lead to perceptions 
that certain out-group are focussed on doing harm or even ending the existence of an in-
group. Staube refers to this as an ideology of antagonism where a system of beliefs is formed 
that maintains that one should have superior power at one’s disposal to guarantee one’s own 
security (Staub, 1990: 52-53). 
 
This distinction between groups does not only lead to problems associated with caring for 
others but it can even lead to the exclusion of the out group from the range of applicability of 
moral values. In other words, the out-group is not deemed worthy of the same moral treatment 
as the in-group. It can therefore be stated that a certain process develops that commences with 
differentiation, goes over into devaluation and eventually ends in moral exclusion where 
torture might actively be supported or at least left unquestioned (Staub, 1990: 53). 
 
 
3.3.2 Just World Thinking 
 
Except for in-group and out-group biases other reasons for passive compliance or active 
participation in torture exists. One of them is just world thinking. Tests have shown that when 
seeing an electrical shock administered to someone else some individuals will have the 
tendency to blame not the administrator but the victim. The rationalization for this is that the 
world is inherently just and seeing that this type of behaviour has not happened to them there 
must be something at fault with the victim or he/she must have done something to deserve this 
type of treatment (Staub, 1990: 56). 
 
 
3.3.3 Resemblance Criterion 
 
Another misperception follows from a representativeness heuristic called a resemblance 
criterion. This heuristic makes individuals believe that causes and effects are equal; it is 
therefore difficult to understand that some events have dissimilar causes. This cognitive bias 
explains conspiracy theories. An example would be the building of the pyramids. It is difficult 
to fathom that the magnificent pyramids were built by slave labour and rudimentary 
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equipment so people create explanations such as otherworldly visitors or the inexplicable 
wisdom of the ancients. The same accounts for torture seeing that the resemblance criterion 
causes individuals to think that information from cruel enemies can only be elicited by means 
of cruel techniques. It is for this reason that techniques usually used for social influence in 
normal social settings seem not to be usable in the case of a dehumanized enemy (Janoff-
Bulman, 2007: 432). 
 
 
3.3.4 The Availability Heuristic 
 
It has been noted that the public’s level of perceived risk associated with a certain threat is 
positively correlated with amount of media coverage dedicated to the risk. This feature of 
public perception can be explained by means of the availability heuristic. The availability 
heuristic is activated when an individual spuriously correlates the importance of a certain 
event with the event’s cognitive availability (Rachlinski, 2004: 575). 
 
No media analysis is needed to uncategorically state that the 9/11 events and the threat of 
terrorism had unsurpassed media coverage. This cognitive availability of an imminent 
terrorist threat leads to the perception of the high risk involved in living in post-9/11 America. 
This redeeming feature of American public perception then led to the demand for 
governmental policy (Rachlinski, 2004: 575) and in the case of the use of torture a society-
wide reluctance to question the means in which actionable intelligence was gathered during 
The War on Terror.       
 
 
3.3.5 The War on Terror as Political Ideology 
 
Another compelling reason is the effect of ideology. Ideology is a difficult term to define but 
according to Heywood all ideologies have the same three, fundamental features. Firstly, there 
is a critique of the existing order. Secondly, there is a vision of a future society. Thirdly the 
most important factor is a theory of political change (2007: 12). It could be stated that The 
War on Terror has surmounted the idea of just a war and has become an ideology in its own 
right. The War on Terror and the political discourse surrounding it meets all of the 
abovementioned criteria. Firstly, it obviously criticizes the idea of American society under 
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constant threat of a 9/11-like terrorist attack. Secondly, there is the vision of a society that 
lives without this threat and thirdly an all out war against all terrorist organization and the 
countries that might host them is proposed as the only way in which to rid the American 
society of this terrorist scourge. 
 
Although an empirical analysis of this subject will never be conclusive one can see what 
ideologies do and try and measure these effects. Weick, an organizational behaviour and 
psychology expert, states that organizations control its member in three distinct ways. Direct 
supervision and orders and routines form two of the ways but the third way is premise control. 
Premise control constitutes assumptions and definitions that are taken as given (Weick, 1995: 
113). These controls are highly influential because they influence and set the underlying 
premises that inform decision making and the way in which people interpret situations. The 
underlying nature of premises also causes them not to be questioned on a regular basis 
(Weick, 1995: 113). Out of the definitions of premise controls and ideologies one can state 
that a large amount of the power that ideology holds over the collective psyche follows from 
the control over the collective premises that societies hold.  
 
An empirical example of this would be the American opinion towards the capabilities of 
terrorist groups since 9/11. As of February 2009 the American public’s opinion on whether 
compared with 9/11 the terrorist’s ability to strike America is greater, the same or less 44% 
felt that the threat is still the same. This is the highest since August 2002 although opinions 
have differed slightly since 9/11 with a lowest of 39% and an average of 40, 75% (Pew 
Research Center, 2009:4). Another example would be empirical research done by Enders & 
Sandler. By means of applying time-series methods to data sets relating to worldwide 
occurrences and treating 9/11 as a structural break it was found that incidents remained at 
their low pre-9/11 after the event. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon was therefore not the start of an outbreak of terrorism.  The only difference was that 
terrorists groups were more prone to use bombing than more logistically difficult and 
expensive missions such as hostage situations (2005: 260).      
 
It could therefore be said that Americans constantly see the terrorist threats as the same 
although no attack on US embassies or US soil has happened in this space of time and the 
levels of transnational terrorism were the same they were before the 9/11 attacks and the 
resultant War on Terror. There must therefore be premises involved in the American 
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perception of terrorism and means of fighting it that are not based on reality but most 
probably in relation to the ideology of The War on Terror. One such premise is that torture is 
effective and that the actionable intelligence gained from torture makes the U.S. a safer place. 
This way of thinking, although it has been proven wrong in the previous chapter, causes a 
lack of public participation in the torture seeing that people are less likely to wilfully 
challenge a policy if it is perceived to increase his/her safety. 
 
 
3.4 The Linkage Between Government Policy and Public Opinion 
 
This linkage between government policy choices and the will of the governed primarily by 
means of voting during general elections, through interaction with civil society by means of 
lobbying and individual communication between elected congressmen and their 
constituencies can be regarded as obvious. How the linkage works in practice is more 
complicated (Erikson & Tedin, 2007: 18). In the following section a non-exhaustive list of 
plausible linkages between public opinion and governmental policy will be discussed. This 
serves the purpose of illustrating how the aforementioned public opinion links with 
governmental policy that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
3.4.1 The Rational Activist Model 
 
The rational activist model presupposes that citizen’s are thoroughly and actively engaged in 
politics in an informed and rational manner. Voting is done by being aware of the various 
candidates’ policy stances and by means of deliberation of the issues in such a manner that the 
constituencies’ will is best reflected by the elected president (Erikson & Tedin, 2007: 19). 
 
 
3.4.2 The Political Parties Model 
 
The political parties model begins with the obvious assumption that parties want to win 
elections by getting the most votes possible. The parties will therefore structure their policies 
in such a manner in their election platforms that it appeals to the broadest possible voter 
segment. In this model the voter does not have to be as engaged as in the rational-actor model. 
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The voter merely has to choose the party that promises the policy stance that represents his 
political preferences (Erikson & Tedin, 2007: 19). 
 
 
3.4.3 The Interest Group Model 
 
The interest group model state that interest groups serve as communicative link between 
representatives and their constituents. Interest groups serve the dual function of informing the 
constituents of representative performance as well as informing representatives on the wants 
and needs of the constituents (Erikson & Tedin, 2007: 20). 
 
 
3.4.4 The Delegate Model 
 
In the delegate model the politician is seen as the voter’s delegate. The politician operates 
under the assumption that he/she is supposed to heed to the public opinion at the risk of not 
being elected again. Public opinion is therefore closely monitored and anticipated (Erikson & 
Tedin, 2007: 20). 
 
 
3.4.5 The Political Sharing Model 
 
Seeing that politicians are raised within society the sharing model proposes that politician’s 
opinions will be representative of the public opinion. According to this model even if there 
are different points of view about a certain policy the different political opinions within 
government will realistically reflect that of the broader society (Erikson & Tedin, 2007: 20-
21).  
 
 
3.5 The Supply of Torturers 
 
In chapter one the training involved in creating torturers was discussed. This proved to 
illustrate how this training conditions individuals to partake in torture without feeling remorse 
for their victims. This does not explain what happened in Abu Ghraib where usual military 
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prison warders took part in torture and general mistreatment of detainees. Some of the abuses 
include: pouring phosphoric chemicals from chemical lights on detainees; threatening 
detainees with a charged pistol; sodomizing a male detainee with a chemical light and 
probably a broomstick; the use of military attack dogs to threaten detainees; threatening male 
detainees with rape; beating detainees with chairs and broomsticks; punching, slapping and 
kicking detainees; a male MP having sex with a female detainee; putting a naked detainee in a 
stress position on a MRE box with a sandbag on his head and attaching wires to his penis, 
fingers and toes to make him believe that if he fell he would be electrocuted; forcing naked 
detainees to masturbate while being videotaped and putting detainees in sexually explicit 
positions and photographing them (Zimbardo, 2007: 357).  
 
This not only illustrates the point made in the first chapter that torture has a way of 
proliferating but also that each individual in society can be a supplier of torture if he or she 
does not take heed of what circumstances they are in. Lifton in Sonntag (2008: 162-164) 
made mention of this in the first chapter when he defined atrocity producing situations as 
situations that are so structured, psychologically and military that ordinary people readily 
engage in atrocities. Meta-analyses (a study that quantitatively summarises the empirical 
findings of a number of studies) have illustrated the large effect of social context on 8 million 
individuals in 25,000 studies. The social circumstances in which a person is situated can make 
anyone take part in abuses such as torture. This property of human behaviour can be 
illustrated by means of the Milgram`s Obedience Experiment and The Stanford Prison 
Experiment in terms of perceived legitimate authority and group dynamics respectively 
(Cuddy et al., 2004: 1482-1483).  
 
 
3.5.1 The Milgram’s Obedience Experiment – The Role of Perceived Legitimate 
Authority 
 
In 1962 an advertisement was sent out in a local newspaper to partake in a memory and 
learning experiment. The test consisted of three people namely an administrator, a teacher and 
a student (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007) and was conducted by Yale University. 
The student was supposed to answer easy questions. One question for instance required that 
the administrator to read three word pairs to the student like: blue box; nice house; wild duck. 
After this had been read a straight forward multiple choice question was asked namely blue: 
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sky; ink; box; lamp. The correct answer would be blue box. If the student got the answer 
wrong a shock from a shock machine would be administered and the teachers were required to 
administer more intense shocks with every consecutive incorrect answer. The shocks went up 
in 15 volt increments and the machine was labelled slight shock, moderate shock, strong 
shock, very strong shock, intense shock, extreme intensity shock, danger: severe shock and 
XXX that constituted a shock of 450 volts (Anderson & Taylor, 2004: 153). 
 
Of course nobody was actually being shocked. The student in the experiment was a trained 
actor and with every shock resulting from an incorrect answer the actor reacted with an 
appropriate response to the shocks. The goal of the study was to see whether if and how many 
teachers would administer the whole 450 volts. In this experiment 65% of the teachers 
administered the maximum shock even if the student protests violently or stops giving any 
response whatsoever (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007).  Even in versions of the 
experiment where the student complained that he had a heart condition or only female 
teachers were used the results did not change. If the teachers asked the administrator if they 
could stop the experiment they were told to: Please continue. The experiment requires that 
you continue. It is absolutely essential that you continue. You have no other choice you must 
go on (Anderson & Taylor, 2004: 153-154).  
 
One of these teachers was William Menold. Subsequent interviews with Menold, one of the 
teacher who shocked the student with the maximum possible amount, reveals that he would 
try to help the student but he would eventually get mad at him for giving the incorrect 
answers. He felt that the further he went the scarier the situation became but the combination 
of circumstance and authority made him feel that he was not responsible for what he was 
doing (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007). What Menolds and the other teachers in 
the experiment did shows how easily ordinary people can be made to do morally repugnant 
deeds. In Menolds own words: If you wanna see what a torturer looks like, just take a look in 
the mirror. You have these naïve ideas that I would never do that. The answer is, yes, you 
would (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007). 
 
 For those that feel that the explanatory power of the obedience experiment is curtailed by the 
notion that the people who took part in the experiment were slyly tricked and coerced into 
administering the shocks another experiment where abusive practices emerged without using 
authority to force participant to administer abuse exists (Zimbardo, 2007: 352).  
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3.5.2 The Stanford Prison Experiment – The Role of Group Dynamics 
 
The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) was done in 1971 under the auspices of Stanford 
University and social psychologist, Philip Zimbardo. Zimbardo would go on to be one of the 
expert witnesses during the trial of one of the prison guards at Abu Ghraib (Zimbardo, 2007: 
IX). Zimbardo was interested in seeing what would happen if you put good people in a bad 
place. The 18 students that were chosen passed the psychological, medical evaluations and 
had no criminal record or history of drug abuse. The students were assigned to be guards or 
prisoners at random and there were no redeeming differences between the two groups 
(Stanford Prison Experiment, 1999). 
 
After a mock arrest some procedures were then done to simulate the oppression of a prison as 
well as the feeling of shame and emasculation felt by prison inmates. These procedures took 
the form of a strip search and a delousing. No underwear could also be worn under their 
dress-like prison uniform that had their new identities (ID numbers which they were supposed 
to use instead of their real names) on them. Deindividuaziation was also done by means of 
wearing a stocking to simulate having one’s hair cropped. The guards received no formal 
guard training but they were told of the seriousness of their tasks and could do everything 
within reason to maintain order in the prison. (Stanford Prison Experiment, 1999). 
 
During the second day the prisoners rebelled against the guards by barricading their cell 
doors, within the mock prison on the Stanford University campus, with their beds. The guards 
who were supposed to contain the rebellion sprayed the prisoners with carbon dioxide from 
the mandatory fire extinguishers. The leader of the rebellion was forced into solitary 
confinement. The guards were under the impression that the guards from the night shift were 
too soft on the prisoners and started to intimidate and harass the prisoners. This harassment 
took the form of push-ups as well as sitting on the prisoners while they did the push-ups. This 
type of punishment also took place in Nazi concentration camps (Stanford Prison Experiment, 
1999). The prisoners were also stripped. This situation coupled with complete control of the 
guards to the extent of not granting the prisoners toilet breaks and forcing them to urinate and 
defecate in buckets that were not cleaned on a regular basis lead to severe emotional strain 
under the prisoners. The guard’s hostility towards the prisoners escalated so badly, especially 
during the night shift when they fought they were not under surveillance, and the prisoners 
began to react to the experiment in such erratic ways, one even got a psychosomatic full-body 
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rash, that the experiment had to be stopped within six days although the experiment was 
supposed to continue for another eight days (Stanford Prison Experiment, 1999).    
 
In this short space of time the guards became so infatuated with their roles that some of them 
protested the end of the study. None of the guards ever came late for their shifts, complained 
or ever asked extra money for doing over time (Stanford Prison Experiment, 1999). Three 
types of guards emerged from this experiment. There were strict but fair guards, good guys 
and one third of the guards were hostile and inventive in humiliating the prisoners. One guard 
was nicknamed John Wayne for his sadistic disposition towards the prisoners. In an interview 
he remembers telling a prisoner that: I’m gonna hit you so hard it’s gonna kill your whole 
family (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007) 
 
Zimbardo explains the abuse of the prisoners on the grounds of the power of situation. He 
feels that the social roles, rules, uniforms and group dynamics can make good people do 
terrible things. In the Lucifer Effect Zimbardo combines the theoretic work of the SPE with 
what happened in Abu Ghraib and states that the abuses were a product of the environment. 
An environment where the usual social and moral constraints against abusive behaviour were 
not applicable to the situation (Zimbardo, 2007: 352). This situation is also most succinctly 
summed up by the prison guard named John Wayne himself: If you have complete control of 
over other human beings it’s a natural human tendency to sort of see what you can do with 
that. And I think most people would enjoy that. (We Have Ways of Making You Talk, 2007). 
Staub states that that these situations, where people are treated in a devalued manner, will lead 
to further abuses seeing that the devaluation is learnt on a learning by doing basis (1990, 55). 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The goal of this chapter was to explain that the use of torture is not merely a military or 
governmental problem but also a societal one. The American society was implicated into the 
use of torture by surveying their opinion towards torture. It was found that the American 
society supports the prohibition against torture in principle but that these opinions are easily 
changed by means of context and that the average American has not educated themselves 
enough about the issues at stake to form an informed and unambiguous opinion. These 
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reasons lead to a general opinion that can only be described as ambivalent. The ticking time 
bomb argument’s seductiveness was also illustrated empirically. 
 
Seeing that this chapter makes use of systems theory the underlying causes for this ambivalent 
opinion was discussed as well as the linkage between public opinion and government policy. 
The first challenge was surmounted by means of social psychology and the advent of seeing 
The War on Terror as a political ideology. The explanatory powers of this paradigm will the 
explored further in the next chapter. The second challenge was non-exhaustively addressed by 
means of voter models. 
 
American society and societies in general were also implicated in the use of torture by the 
provision of would-be torturers. The Milgram’s Obedience Experiment and The Stanford 
Prison Experiment respectively gave scientific testimony to the power of authority and social 
dynamics in influencing human behaviour. 
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Chapter 4 – The Governmental Policy Model of Torture 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it was illustrated by means of The Milgram’s Obedience Experiment 
and The Stanford Prison Experiment that individuals are prone to do harm to or even torture 
others given the correct, authoritative circumstances. This harm referred to by Kelman as 
crimes of obedience and defined as an act performed in response to orders from authority that 
is considered illegal or immoral by the larger community (Kelman, 124: 2005). 
 
After  a confidential report written by Major General Antonio Taguba that reported on the 
systemic and illegal abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib was published on 24 April 2004 by The 
New Yorker and photos surfaced of prisoners in sexually compromising positions as well as 
corpses on the CBS network (Hersh, 2004) the U.S. government made an effort to express the 
use of torture as equivalent to initiation rituals at American colleges or merely the work of a 
few bad apples (Bovard, 2009: 109) (Hooks & Mosher, 2005: 1630). These attempts to 
downplay the seriousness of the abuses or, most importantly, shift the blame to low-rung 
members of the military stand in sharp contrast to the testimony of the legal memorandums, 
colloquially known as the torture memos, written by the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Office of Legal Council in the United States Justice Department Jay Bybee. These official 
memos, that the US government published after pressure from the press, especially the 
Washington Post, illustrate how the Bush administration defined torture in very narrow terms, 
circumvented the Geneva Convention of 1949 by defining Afghanistan as a failed state and 
the prisoners of war from Afghanistan as unlawful combatants, broadening the scope of 
presidential power over and above the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1987 and it’s Congressional statute as well as 
favouring domestic policy above international legal obligations (Dratel & Greenberg, 2005: 
XIV-XV). The US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, also sanctioned torture 
techniques (Washington Post, 2004). 
 
Although individuals who did the actual deeds are and should be held accountable in 
accordance with the first Nüremberg Principle (a set of guiding principles that establishes 
whether an act constitutes a war crime) and states that Any person who commits an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to 
punishment (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005) The memorandums draw 
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attention towards the policy context that lead to the circumstances and (un)spoken consent 
conducive to the abusive treatment and torture of detainees in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and 
secret military detention centres known as black sites, which the Red Cross aren’t allowed to 
inspect or even know the details of the detainees (Washington Post, 2005), which runs 
contrary to the few bad apples rationalization (Kelman, 2005: 124-126). This chapter will 
analyze the US policy of torture by means of discussing the history of the use of torture as 
foreign policy instrument, the impact of the al-Qaeda-led 9/11 attacks, how the changing role 
of the US within the global political system and the state of democracy within the US during 
The War on Terror had led to the loss of international and domestic checks and balances on 
US power and led the Bush administration not only to fall for the cognitive seductiveness of 
the torture argument but also the (re)enactment of it. 
 
 
4.2 An American History of Torture and Governmental Power 
 
Although this case study of torture could be stated to be the best documented and most 
institutionalized example of torture within a democratic society it would be a mistake to 
conclude that this is America’s first foray into torture. For the past 50 years the CIA has been 
developing forms of psychological torture that is designed to thwart attempts at investigation, 
prohibition and prosecution and have actively practiced it in South Vietnam, Brazil, Iran, 
Honduras and Latin America at a cost of US$1 billion annually (McCoy, 2009). 
 
The U.S. government was under the impression that the Soviets have developed a way of 
extracting information from the human psyche Special Interrogation Program was launched 
to see whether medical science could be helpful in asserting control over individuals. After no 
success whatsoever the focus shifted to methods concerned in psychological coercion this 
lead to the infamous Project Artichoke the goal of which was the development of any method 
by which we can get information from a person against his will and without his knowledge. 
This project found that sensory deprivation can lead to a state of mental disorganization 
within two days. After American prisoners of war (POWs) in North Korea started making 
false press statements the focus shifted towards training that would possibly be able to 
increase resistance towards ideological brainwashing. This interest lead to the development of 
the SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resist, Escape) program. Two threads of interrogation research 
thus developed, one focussed on resistance and the other on developing psychologically-based 
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torture techniques. In 1963 the later effort culminated in the KUBARK counter-intelligence 
interrogation manual. This manual stated that psychological torture mechanisms such as 
sensory overload and deprivation were effective because it led to a state of dependence on the 
interrogator which made the chance of compliance better (Chomsky, 2009) (McCoy, 2009).  
 
After these techniques were refined the U.S. government began to actively export these 
techniques to its military allies. The School of the America was a U.S. training facility near 
Panama City where U.S. and troops from other Latin American countries were taught 
psychological torture techniques such as sleep deprivation, hooding, forced nudity and stress 
positions from 1946 until 1984. The graduates from this school would later take part in 
various human rights atrocities throughout Latin America with the torture of Argentineans 
during the Dirty War and the El Mozote massacre in El Salvador (Klein, 2005).   
 
The techniques that were taught at the school of the America’s and later at a similar institute 
in Fort Benning, Georgia were developed by means of experiments on psychiatric patients 
and tested during the Vietnam War as part of operation Phoenix. During this operation the 
U.S. ran forty interrogation centres where between 20, 000 and 46,000 detainees were killed 
on an extrajudicial basis and thousands more were tortured (Klein, 2005) (McCoy, 2009).  In 
a historical precedent to the abuses at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib the Clinton 
administration used the U.S. government’s previously discussed ability to make reservations 
within international agreements to amend the U.N. Convention Against Torture in 1994. The 
U.S. government was allowed to create their own custom definition of mental torture. 
According to the U.S. version of mental torture it includes the four acts of physical pain, the 
administration of drugs, death threats or threats to harm family or acquaintances. In this 
version no mention is made of the staples of U.S. psychological torture such as sensory 
deprivation and self-inflicted pain. This would thus mean that the U.S. made exceptions for 
their brand of torture within the U.N. Convention Against Torture. This definition of mental 
torture is still found on a verbatim basis in Section 2340 of the U.S. Federal Code as well as 
the Expanded War Crimes Act of 1997.  This exempts the CIA agents from life imprisonment 
or a death sentence when it comes to the use of psychological torture and lays the groundwork 
for torture to proliferate yet again (McCoy, 2009).  
 
The tendency to pay political lip service to torture while leaving loop holes for further abuses 
intact by means of the wording is also found in the Detainee Treatment Act of 15 December 
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2005 that states that the U.S. Congress prohibits the use of torture and cruel and degrading 
treatment. This piece of legislation on the other hand also included the Graham-Levin 
Amendment that took away the right of detainees at Guantanamo Bay to take legal action 
against their treatment and as well as recommendations to use information obtained by means 
of torture when assessing their status (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
 
It could therefore be stated that America has taken part in torture before and it formed part of 
their foreign policy since the war in Vietnam. One of the major problems is that this debate is 
framed in such a manner that the policy decision to torture is framed as a single event and not 
an emergent property of an American reliance on torture, society and political process. 
Senator John McCain’s statements on torture are exemplary of this seeing that he states that 
America never took part in torture before 9/11 (Klein, 2005). This new episode of torture is 
therefore not unique although commentators do tend to address it as if it only started at 9 
September 2009 (Klein, 2005). An example of this would be Paul Krugman’s remark: never 
before have our leaders so utterly betrayed everything our nation stands for (Chomsky, 
2009). This hides the facts that the U.S. government resorted back to an old, latent foreign 
policy measure which they will resort to again given the correct circumstances (when checks 
and balances are averted) seeing that: The natural tendency of Government is towards abuse 
of power. Men entrusted with power, even those aware of its dangers tend, particularly when 
pressured to slight liberty (The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1976). The debate over torture should therefore not be 
framed not as an isolated incident but rather as an extension of intentional and ongoing U.S. 
foreign policy within a post-9/11 world. 
   
4.3 The Impact of 9/11 and the Policy Reaction to It 
 
The four hijackings of passenger aircraft during the 11th of September 2001 proved to be a 
unique terrorist attack in a number of ways. The number of deaths on that day was more than 
all the deaths from transnational terrorism from 1988 until 2000 and no other terrorist attack, 
national or transnational, ever took more than 500 lives (Enders & Sandler, 2005: 260). The 
terrorist attack also illustrated that US$90 billion in losses and the abovementioned casualties 
could be achieved without the possession of a weapon of mass destruction and that 
fundamentalist groups, such as al-Qaeda, perceive civilians to be legitimate targets for violent 
attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2005: 260). The 9/11 attacks can also be seen as the first effective 
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transnational attack by religious fundamentalists. Before 9/11 most transnational terrorist 
attacks were motivated by nationalism, separatism, Marxism or nihilism (Enders & Sandler, 
2005: 262).  
 
These attacks lead to greater awareness of the vulnerabilities faced from terrorist attacks by 
industrialized countries (Enders & Sandler, 2005: 260). Within a short space of time after the 
9/11 attack the CIA were given permission to capture and use deadly force against al-Qaeda 
operatives (Arnson & Strum: 2007:1) and manage a worldwide prison network where 
detainees could be detained on an indefinite basis at secret black sites (McCoy, 2009). The 
Bush administration believed that al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations that relied on 
asymmetrical warfare posed a more serious and unconventional threat than what has ever 
been faced by previous governments.  This perception and the lack of human intelligence 
(HUMINT), intelligence professionals who have infiltrated these organizations garnered the 
intelligence paradigm that could be summed up by then Vice-president Dick Cheney’s 
comment during a Frontline interview: We have to work the dark side, if you will. Spend time 
in the shadows of the intelligence world (PBS, 2002). Cofer Black, the previous Director of 
the CIA Counterterrorist Center, echoed this sentiment with his statement regarding 
operational flexibility: … after 9/11 the gloves came off (Black, 2002).  
 
Before 9/11 the US Army Field Manual 34-52 was the ruling standard on how to conduct the 
interrogation of prisoners of war. FM 34-52 relied on rapport based techniques but after al-
Qaeda members showed considerable resistance against these previously sufficient 
techniques. In addition the Manchester Manual was found on the personal computer of an al-
Qaeda member in England. This manual included a chapter on how to resist interrogation in 
accordance with FM 34-52 (Sands, 2008: 24 & 52). This caused interrogators to ask whether 
there existed a more flexible approach towards interrogation than what FM 34-52 presented. 
As Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commanding Officer of Joint Task Force Guantanamo 
(Sands, 2008: XIV) stated with regards to rapport based techniques: That won’t happen if the 
detainee knows the route you’re taking. You can’t interrogate them in the ordinary way. 
That’s the problem I had (Sands, 2008: 52). 
 
The perception of a severe unconventional threat and a series of unsuccessful interrogations 
lead to the paradigm that greater operational flexibility was needed when interrogating al-
Qaeda members. The Bush administration then turned towards the lawyers of the Office of 
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Legal Council to establish what degree of operational flexibility was legally feasible. (Dratel 
& Greenberg, 2005: XIII). Analysis of the legal documents show that operational flexibility 
with regards to interrogation was achieved by means of wilfully misinterpreting laws relating 
to the Geneva Convention, presidential power, the definition of torture and what techniques 
constitute torture.   
 
 
4.3.1 The Torture Policy Process and The Geneva Convention of 1949 
 
On 9 January 2002 a memorandum written by John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General and Robert Delahunty, the Deputy General Council at the White House Office of 
Homeland Security was submitted to William Haynes the General Council to the US 
Department of Defence. This memorandum argued that al-Qaeda members are not eligible for 
protection the Geneva Convention seeing that al-Qaeda is a non-state actor and the nature of 
the conflict is different than conventional warfare (Delahunty & Yoo, 2002: 11). The 
protection of the Geneva Convention was also not applicable to the Taliban, the ruling 
organization in Afghanistan, seeing that Afghanistan is regarded as a failed state and the 
Taliban as a militia (Delahunty & Yoo, 2002: 14). This memorandum preceded the 18 
January 2002 presidential decision that al-Qaeda and Taliban members would not be afforded 
the protection of the Geneva Convention (International Law of War Association, 2005) and 
the 19 January 2002 Rumsfeld order that stated that al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners of war 
are not entitled to prisoner of war status for the purposes of the Geneva Convention of 1949 
and that commanders should treat them humanely and, to the extent of appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity (Rumsfeld, 2002).   
 
Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, remarked on this abovementioned memoranda that 
questioning the applicability of the Geneva Convention in terms of al-Qaeda and Taliban 
members would have the advantage of maximum policy flexibility during the War on Terror 
but it would also have the disadvantage of reversing over a century of U.S. policy and 
practice in supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law of 
war for our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general and it has a high cost in terms 
of negative international reaction, with immediate adverse consequences for our conduct of 
foreign policy (Powell, 2002: 2). William H.Taft, legal advisor at the U.S. Department of 
State also echoed Powell sentiments by stating that from a policy standpoint, a decision that 
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the Conventions apply provides the best legal basis for treating the Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees in the way we intend to treat them. It demonstrates that the United States bases its 
conduct not just on its policy preferences but on its international legal obligations (Taft, 
2002: 1). 
 
This sentiment, that going against international institutions and agreements had obvious 
pitfalls, both shared by Powell and Taft, was overridden by Alberto Gonzales the Attorney 
General. He stated that The War on Terror is a new type of warfare that did not resemble the 
conventional type of warfare that the Geneva Convention is applicable to and this puts a 
premium on obtaining information as quickly as possible to stop future atrocities. According 
to Gonzales these factors render the Geneva Convention limitations to be obsolete (Gonzales, 
2002: 2). 
 
4.3.2 The Torture Policy Process and Presidential Power 
 
The abovementioned 9 January 2002 memorandum by Delahunty and Yoo included the first 
mention of overriding power of the president in foreign relations. According to the Article II 
of the U.S. Constitution the president is vested with federal executive power and shall be 
commander and chief and that he shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties. This means that the president has control of how foreign 
relations will be conducted since the domain of foreign relations is the domain of the 
executive. This executive power grants the president the right to suspend treaties without 
being bound by international law. In the case of Afghanistan the status of failed state and link 
with Al-Qaeda are seen to be sufficient grounds for making the Geneva Convention and the 
War Crimes Act of 1996 inapplicable to Taliban members (Delahunty & Yoo, 2002: 2 & 11 
& 37). Delahunty and Yoo therefore concluded that any restriction of presidential power 
relating to military matters and including the treatment of prisoners could be described as 
constitutionally dubious (Dratel & Greenberg, 2005: XV). 
 
This argument was augmented by the 1 August 2002 memorandum sent by Jay Bybee, the 
Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales. Instead of stating that Congressional 
intervention pertaining to presidential executive power might go against the constitution the 
wielding of unquestioned executive power was now depicted as a military necessity. The line 
of reasoning stated that terrorist groups relied on surprise attacks and secret operations and 
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that information was therefore even more than important in the fight against terrorism than 
during conventional warfare. It could therefore be said that Congressional regulation of 
interrogation techniques could be likened to Congressional regulation of the tactics of armed 
forces on the battlefield and would therefore against go the Constitutional right of the 
president as commander in chief (Bybee, 2002: 32-33).      
 
4.3.3 The Torture Policy Process and the Definition of Torture 
 
The 1 August 2002 memorandum from Bybee to Gonzales, that would later be known as the 
Bybee Memo, delivers a legal opinion on the standards of conduct with regards to the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. This U.S. law makes it a criminal offense for 
any person outside the United States to commit to or attempt  to commit torture. (1) Section 
2340 defines the act of torture as an act committed by a person acting under the color of law 
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person with his custody or physical 
control (Bybee, 2002: 3). 
 
In his opinion Bybee would redefine what torture is by redefining what severe physical and 
mental harm entails. On the subject of severe physical harm Bybee makes use of West Va. 
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey to state that although these statutes address a substantially 
different subject from Section 2340, they are nonetheless helpful for understanding what 
constitutes severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are 
likely to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate 
medical treatment. Such damage must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the 
permanent impairment of a significant body function. These statutes suggest that "severe 
pain," as used in Section 2340, must rise to a similarly high level — the level that would 
ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, 
organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions — in order to constitute torture 
(Bybee, 2002: 6). 
 
On the subject of severe mental pain or suffering Section 2340 states that severe mental pain 
or suffering is the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from - (A) the intentional 
infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; 
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(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality; (C)the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will 
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly 
the senses or personality (Bybee, 2002: 6-7). In his legal opinion Bybee puts emphasis on the 
intentional element of torture. In this way he constructs a defence based on the notion of good 
faith. According to Bybee the law could be negated by showing that a defendant acted in good 
faith that his actions would not cause severe mental pain or suffering. This can be achieved by 
proving that he surveyed professional literature, consulted with experts or reviewed evidence 
that was gained by past experience (Bybee, 2002: 8). The result was that the laws regarding 
torture would only be applicable to the most extreme acts. 
 
4.3.4 The Torture Policy Process and Torture Techniques 
 
Two months after the 9/11 attacks the Rumsfeld’s aides contacted the Survival Evasion Resist 
Escape (SERE) personnel to learn whether SERE could help in developing interrogation 
techniques for use in Guantanamo Bay (Madden, 2009). 
 
James Mitchell was a psychologist at the SERE program and although he has never done a 
real interrogation he has monitored interrogations during SERE training exercises. According 
to Mitchell the success of an interrogation hinged upon the psychological concept of learnt 
helplessness. The developer of this concept Martin Seligman does not share this view. He 
states that learnt helplessness will lead to compliance but not truth telling (Mazetti & Shane, 
2009).  
 
Mitchell and another SERE psychologist, Bruce Jessen, served as advisors to the CIA and 
both advised that al-Qaeda and Taliban members would not respond to conventional 
techniques due to fundamental personality differences. In the rush to avert another terrorist 
attack the CIA listened to this advice without taking the history and real purpose of these 
techniques into account. These techniques that included water boarding, stress positions and 
sleep deprivation were used in the 1950’s to produce false confessions from American 
prisoners of war. A 1956 study on these techniques concluded that these techniques could not 
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be differentiated from torture and it made prisoners suggestible, malleable and prone to 
confabulation (Mazetti & Shane, 2009). 
 
In an 11 October 2002 memorandum (JTF-170-J2) from Jerald Phifer, the Director of Joint 
Task Force 170 at Guantanamo Bay Cuba, requested approval for a set of interrogation 
techniques to counter advanced resistance from al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees. The 
techniques were classified in three categories. Category I techniques included yelling and 
deception which included multiple interrogator techniques and false identities of interrogators 
(the interrogators would be allowed to identify themselves as coming from a different country 
with a reputation of using harsh interrogation techniques (Phifer, 2002: 1-2). Category II 
techniques included stress positions for a maximum of four hours, falsified document or 
reports, isolation for up to 30 days, use of different environment than interrogation booths, 
sensory deprivation, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, non-allowance of comfort items such as 
religious books, meals ready to eat (MREs) instead of hot rations, nudity, forced grooming 
including facial hair and using detainees individual phobias. Category III techniques, that 
were reserved for the most uncooperative detainees included: the use of scenarios to convince 
him of imminent harm to him or his family, exposure to cold climatic conditions or water, 
using a wet towel to create the perception of drowning by means of activating the mammalian 
diving reflex (McCoy, 2009), non-injurious physical contact such as poking and pushing 
(Phifer, 2002: 1-2).  
 
After the legal processes where the al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not afforded the 
legal protection of the Geneva Convention that is implied by prisoner of war status and the 
president’s power as commander-in-chief it was possible to pronounce in the legal brief on 
these techniques that: The counter-resistance techniques proposed in the JTF-170-J2 
memorandum are lawful because they do not violate the Eight Amendment to the United 
States Constitution or the federal torture statute as explained below. An international law 
analysis is not required for the current proposal because the Geneva Conventions do not 
apply to these detainees since they are not EPWs (enemy prisoners of war) (Beaver, 2002: 4). 
In addition a memo would later be written to John Rizzo, General Council to the CIA, by the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Steven Bradbury that addressed the issue of 
whether certain techniques such as dietary manipulation, stress positions, water boarding and 
sleep deprivation used in combination would constitute torture. In conclusion Bradbury stated 
that: In the view of the experience from past interrogations, the judgment of medical and 
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psychological personnel, and the interrogation team’s diligent monitoring of the effects of 
combining interrogation techniques, interrogators would not reasonably expect that the 
combined use of the interrogation methods under consideration, subject to the conditions and 
safeguards set forth here and in Techniques would result in severe, physical or mental pain or 
suffering within the meaning of sections 2340-2340A (Bradbury, 2005: 68).    
 
On 2 December 2002 Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defence, approved an action 
memorandum, from William Haynes, that gave permission to the Commander of  
SOUTHCOM to allow the use of category I and II techniques and only the use of non-
injurious physical contact out of category III. It was stated that the all the category III 
techniques were legally permissible but should not be used as a matter of policy. The memo 
also had a handwritten note from Rumsfeld: However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is 
standing limited to four hours? (Haynes & Rumsfeld, 2002: 1). Rumsfeld’s approval reached 
Camp X-Ray, the maximum security facility at Guantanamo Bay, on the 2nd of December 
2002. The torture interrogation of, Detainee 063, Mohammed al-Qahtani, alleged to be the 
20th 9/11 hijacker began (Sands, 2008: 8). Qahtani was subject to 48 interrogations of between 
18 and 20 hours within 54 days. He was forced to do dog tricks, threatened buy an attack dog, 
forced to wear a bra and thong on his head, strip searched and forced to stand naked in front 
of a female interrogator. The combination of physical and psychological abuse had the effect 
that he had to be hospitalized twice for a heart condition. The unrestrained way in which he 
was interrogated within the framework of Rumsfeld’s approval lead to him not being 
prosecuted due to the fact that he was tortured (Woodward, 2009).  
 
 
4.3.5 The Torture Policy Process and Congressional Oversight 
      
According to U.S. law 413 on General Congressional Oversight Provisions the President has 
to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are fully informed of all intelligence 
activities as well as any likely intelligence activities (Cornell University, 2009). The decision 
to use torture as a policy instrument shows that this oversight mechanism is faulty. Different 
reasons for this exist but it can all be attribute to the misuse of the Gang of Eight. The Gang 
of Eight forms part of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 that was written shortly after the 
Church Committee’s recommendations. This system allows the president to limit access of 
intelligence and covert activities to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
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congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House of 
Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or 
members of the congressional leadership as may be included by the President (Cornell 
University, 2009) but only under emergency circumstances. The state of constant mobilization 
and emergency brought on by The War on Terror means that this temporary accommodation 
eventually became the customary way of making intelligence policy decisions (Hayes, 2009).  
 
The quality of these briefs are also problematic. The members of the Gang of Eight aren’t 
allowed to make notes or have their staff present during a briefing. They are also not allowed 
to discuss what happens during the briefing with anyone seeing that they are briefed on an 
individual basis. As the former U.S. government counterterrorism expert, Richard Clarke, 
states: That’s oversight? That’s pretence at oversight. That’s a box check. The law required 
us to do that and we did this (Hayes, 2009). Vicky Divoll, general counsel of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee in 2002, echoes this sentiment by stating that this system causes the 
very programs that are among the most risky and controversial, and that therefore should get 
the greatest congressional oversight in fact get the least (Mazetti & Shane, 2009). 
 
4.4 The Failure of International and Domestic Checks And Balances 
  
From the analysis of the legal documents, the perceptions that fostered the birth of the torture 
policy and the subversion of congressional oversight cognitive seductiveness of the torture 
argument are illustrated. The Bush administration decided on the use of torture without 
questioning their premises or even the origin of the torture techniques (Mazetti & Shane, 
2009). The interpretation of laws is dubious at best and the product of the policy has done 
irreparable damage to the legitimacy U.S. foreign policy. 
 
This leaves commentators and analysts to fall into the trap of value judgments. The false 
premise of that they hold is that the policy process is inherently just and that failed policy 
reflects upon the morals and values of the policy makers. This premise is false seeing that 
constitutional safeguards and due policy processes exist to curtail the non-consequentialist 
negative influences of policy decisions that emerge under conditions of uncertainty and time 
constraints (Rejali, 2007: 536). By bearing this in mind one is forced to reframe the torture 
debate. The question should not be why the policy decision to torture was made seeing that 
this line of thought leads up the blind alley of value judgments. The question should be how 
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the torture evolved from a theoretical possibility to real world enactment. This line of thought 
shifts the intention from inherent disgust to the more analytical question of how international 
and domestic checks and balances on U.S. power failed in the post 9/11 climate. 
.  
   
4.4.1 Unilateralism as Foreign Policy Organizing Principle 
 
Participation in the international community (multilateralism) restrains states by means of the 
institutional checks and balances on sovereign policy power. In the case of the U.S. their 
unique role in the global political system makes it possible to influence these sets of checks 
and balances (Echeverria, 2004: 2) and in some cases even operate totally outside it. 
Ironically this means that the U.S. is not afforded the protection from bad policy decisions 
that other weaker states enjoy.   
 
 
Ruggie in Monten (2007: 121) defines multilateralism as an institutional form [including 
norms, regimes, and formal multilateral organizations] that coordinates relations among 
three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct. Multilateralism can 
therefore be seen as an international social contract where states trade policy autonomy with 
each other on differing issues to eventually reach an equilibrium point where mutual policy 
demands are met. In the strictest sense multilateralism does not refer to the automatic or 
accidental policy fit since it’s an active and deliberate process. Unilaterism, on the other hand, 
is when policy choices are made outside of a rule-based institutional framework or without 
consultation with other states. (Monten, 2007: 121-122). 
 
This principle of foreign policy organization has especially been implemented by America in 
terms of defence matters. Since 2001 America has withdrawn support for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1996, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997, 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and 
attacked Iraq even though it fell outside the legal framework of the Charter of the United 
Nations of 1945. Donald Rumsfeld, the American Secretary of Defense’s notion that the 
mission determines the coalition, and we don’t allow coalitions to determine the mission also 
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shows that even collaborative efforts are built around American policy objectives and not 
negotiated policy compromises (Monten, 2007: 122).  
 
The American unilateral approach to foreign policy is based on the assumption of American 
political exceptionalism. American political institutions, culture and history are seen as 
inherently different to any other state and because of the American foreign policy assumption 
that America has a responsibility to better the world community. This perceived international 
noblesse oblige flows from a combination of normative and causal belief represented by the 
neo-conservative group of thinkers and changes in the post Cold War word political system. 
(Monten, 2007: 131). 
 
 
4.4.1.1 International Causes of Unilateralism: Unilateralism as Emergent 
Property of Post-Cold War Political System 
 
After World War II the US took part in multilateral treaties on a hegemonic basis where 
multilateral treaties and institutions did not curtail US political power but served to express it 
seeing that hegemony is a form of leadership were policy making power is wielded by means 
of the consent of the governed instead of coercion. In this system consent is manufactured by 
means of, what is commonly referred to as, an institutional bargain. Within this institutional 
bargain states wilfully gave up policy autonomy to the US and granted the US greater policy 
freedom within the multilateral framework and chose not to the sanction the US even when 
action was taken outside the framework. In exchange the other states got military protection, 
economic aid, protection against internal dissent, entry towards US markets as well as a set of 
rules and institutions that lead to international stability and other collective goods that flowed 
from such an arrangement (Skidmore, 2005: 209-210). 
 
This institutional bargain has two inherent tensions. Firstly, the US can invoke special policy 
autonomy up until the point that other members of the multilateral framework feel that they 
will benefit from another form of international political organization. Secondly, it is very 
costly to act as sponsor of multilateral institutions and the main enforcer of its rules and 
regulations. This system could therefore be said to be very unstable because of the pro-US 
institutional double standard and the fine balancing act where the US tries to appease the 
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members of the multilateral system by means of sponsorship while trying to let other states 
carry some of the costs involved (Skidmore, 2005: 211-212). 
 
This system’s, with its in-built contradictions, success was due to the Soviet Union non-
participation and especially the resulting Cold-War which bound the US and its allies in a 
mutually dependent relationship. The US needed allies to curtail the power of the Soviet 
Union which caused the them to temporarily give up the balancing act between almost 
exclusive sponsorship and making their allies cover some of the costs. Their allies on the 
other hand sought protection from the Soviet expansionism and were willing to give the US 
almost complete policy autonomy in exchange for security. After the end of the Cold War the 
abovementioned tensions were resurrected again seeing that the US was not willing to carry 
the burden of sponsorship anymore and its allies were unwilling to grant the US its previous 
levels of policy autonomy. This had the effect that the US decided on expressing US power 
by means of the unilateral route instead of the hegemonic one (Skidmore, 2005: 212-213) 
(Gardner, 2005: 27). 
 
 
4.4.1.2 US Unilateralism and Militarism as Neo-Conservative Political Ideology 
 
In December 2002, prior to the outbreak of the war in Iraq, the American public was surveyed 
by the Pew Research Center on their attitudes towards multilateralism. On the question of 
whether the US should cooperate fully with the UN 67% agreed and only 25% agreed that 
should go their own way without consulting their allies seeing that they are the most powerful 
country in the world (Skidmore, 2005: 220). This dissonance between governmental 
international policy and public opinion can be explained on two fronts. Firstly unilateral 
organizations seem to be better organized than the widely dispersed multilateral minority and 
the American political system is prone to minority influence due to its decentralized and open 
nature. This leaves the political playing field wide open for minority groups to influence 
governmental policy (Skidmore, 2005: 220). One such group is the neo-conservatives.   
 
The neo-conservatives held direct policy influence especially after 9/11 (Ikenberry, 2004:7).  
The reason for this is that directly after the 9/11 attacks the neo-conservatives had a distinct 
advantage compared to other policy makers and think tanks in the form of a relevant policy. It 
was not a customized policy, it might have been older than a decade but it addressed the 
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terrorism issue and their first-mover advantage allowed them to frame the debate (Clarke & 
Halper, 2004: 138). Max Boot, a highly regarded, self-proclaimed neo-conservative and 
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, was asked by the Christian Science 
Monitor how much political power neo-conservatives have within Washington and the Bush 
administration. He replied that although neo-conservatism’s all-round political influence is 
exaggerated and could partly be explained due to the fact that their ideas are forcefully and 
clearly articulated 9/11 did have an impact on the war in Iraq because 9/11 brought various 
doubters including Bush and Cheney around to the neocon [servative] sic point of view 
(Christian Science Monitor, 2004).  
 
On the 20th of September 2001, a few days after the 9/11 attacks, the Project for a New 
American Century, a neo-conservative think tank, wrote an open letter to George W. Bush. 
The letter recommended a regime change in Iraq (Project for the New American Century, 
2001). The war in Iraq is illustrative of the combined influence of the neo-conservatives and 
9/11 on Bush, whose first presidential campaign was against nation building and excessive 
international military intervention. Bush also chose the headquarters of the American 
Enterprise Institute, a think tank described as the de facto headquarters for neo-conservative 
policy which has been campaigning for a war in Iraq more than ten years prior to the 
outbreak, for an important speech where he stated that victory in Iraq will greatly help 
towards peace in the Middle East (Christian Science Monitor, 2004).      
 
Except for a policy that addressed terrorism neo-conservatives also have an influence on 
policy by means of links with the Republican Party and senior officials within the Bush 
administration (Christian Science Monitor, 2004). The Project for the New American 
Century, a neo-conservative think tank that is chaired by William Kristol, states that they are 
a non-profit educational organization dedicated to a few fundamental propositions: that 
American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership 
requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle (Project for 
the New American Century, 1997). In their 3th of June 1997 Statement of Principles they 
state inter alia that defense spending should be increased and that the US should accept 
responsibility for creating an international order that coincides with US security, principles 
and prosperity. This statement was signed by government officials such as Dick Cheney, 
Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz as well as Jeb Bush. Richard Perle, a Pentagon policy 
advisor until 2004, is also associated with this think tank (SourceWatch, 2008). The date of 
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the statement, which predates the 9/11-attack, as well as the abovementioned list of officials 
show that the neo-conservatives already had a measure of influence within the government 
prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Project for the New American Century, 1997). 
 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Neo-Conservative Normative Beliefs 
 
Normative beliefs can be described as a set of mental criteria that inform judgments on 
whether something is inherently wrong or right. The American political decision makers have 
the following set of normative views regarding American unilateralist foreign policy.  
 
Firstly, the widely held belief exists that American foreign might is inherently benign and 
virtuous. This is most succinctly summed up by Woodrow Wilson on American principles: 
they are the principles of forward-looking men everywhere… They are principles of mankind 
and must prevail. George W. Bush echoed this sentiment in his inaugural speech in January 
2005: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in 
other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world 
(Monten, 2007: 131).  
 
Secondly, what is seen as beneficial for American foreign policy is automatically seen as 
beneficial for the rest of the world as well as stated by neo-conservatives Robert Kaplan and 
William Kristol: Americans should understand that their support for pre-eminence is as much 
a boost for international  justice as any people is capable of giving (Monten, 2007: 131-132).  
 
Thirdly, the American polity and its institutions are regarded as such exceptional institutions 
that it should not be subjected to any form of outside influence. Francis Fukuyama, a member 
of the neo-conservative group – The Project for the New American Century (Project for the 
New American Century, 2007), states that this normative belief stems from a wider normative 
belief that the American nation state is a source of legitimacy in its own right in contrast to 
Europeans that look to multilateral agreements and approval for legitimacy. The neo-
conservatives such as John Bolton have also reinforced this normative belief with the 
following statement: The question of legitimacy is frequently raised as veiled attempt to 
restrain American discretion in undertaking unilateral action… Our actions, taken 
consistently with Constitutional principles, require no separate, external validation to make 
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them legitimate (Monten, 2007: 131-132). This belief is also echoed by Robert Kagan: 
Multilateralism is a weapon of the weak and Max Boot: Power breeds unilateralism. It is as 
simple as that (Ikenberry, 2004: 15). 
 
 
4.4.1.2.2 Neo-Conservative Causal Beliefs  
 
Causal beliefs are beliefs regarding the cause of a certain outcome and are used especially 
during planning of strategic objectives. According to Monten America holds two causal 
beliefs relating to unilateralism. The first is that the Bush administration believed that the 
large power differential in the global system, with America as the hegemon, will lead to less 
competition from its international peers. The overwhelming power of America therefore does 
not provoke competition but leads to the stabilization of the system with America at the 
forefront. This neo-conservative logic will therefore endorse the wielding of this power in a 
unilateralist fashion seeing that this practice will lead to a larger power differential with 
America at the forefront. A natural consequence of this is that American position is 
quintessentially based on military power and the provision of security (Monten, 2007: 133-
134) (Ikenberry, 2004:7). 
 
The second set of causal beliefs involves the discount rate in international political 
interactions. Robert Axelrod states that cooperation can only flow out of anarchy if there 
exists multiple rounds of interaction and a discount rate or a margin at which future gains are 
discounted relative to immediate gains (Monten, 2007: 127). When America embarked on the 
War on Terror the discount rate changed dramatically seeing that America puts a bigger 
emphasis on immediate unilateral strategic control than the future benefits that flow from 
multilateral policy interaction. The American administration also has what James Mann refers 
to as an extraordinary optimistic assessment of American capabilities and they feel that there 
has been no decline in US power. The premises that drive the logic of multilateral interaction 
is therefore not present (Monten, 2007: 134-135).  
 
Multilateralism is not seen as a way to institutionalize American international pre-eminence 
but rather as a burden due to the constraints it puts on international policy autonomy. This 
notion has given birth to the idea of new unilateralism. The neo-conservative commentator 
Krauthammer in Ikenberry (2004: 9) sums this idea up as follows: After eight years during 
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which foreign policy success was largely measured by the number of treaties the president 
could sign and the number of summits he could attend, we now have an administration willing 
to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of American national interest. Rather 
than contain power within a vast web of constraining international agreement, the new 
unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of 
self-defined global ends Another more philosophical notion is that multilateralism is a means 
that other states use to constraint US policy up to the point that it threatens US sovereignty. 
This view is widely held by neo-conservatives and especially so by John Bolton before he 
became Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in 2001 (U.S. 
Department of State, 2007) (Ikenberry, 2004: 9). 
 
One of the principles that guide US unilateralism is that terrorism cannot be fought within the 
multilateral context because the inherent constraints within the system limit the severity and 
ability to strike pre-emptively therefore the neo-conservatives insist that military might must 
be put at the forefront of international relations so that the US can be seen not only as an able 
but also willing military contender. According to neo-conservative logic a military show of 
force will pre-emptively stop strikes against the US due to force (Ikenberry, 2004: 9). 
 
The neo-conservative success with the adoption of their policy also had a very important 
operational effect. Their focus on bringing justice to not only the terrorist groups but also the 
states that harboured them by military means lead to a much more dangerous movement 
towards state-on-state conflict compared to political and intelligence based means that have 
proven to be successful antiterrorist measures in Northern Ireland and the Basque region of 
Spain. This had the effect that the policy focus was on way to thwart further terrorist attacks 
instead of addressing the issues that lead to the 9/11 attacks in the first place (Clarke & 
Halper, 2004: 138). 
 
4.4.2 The Domestic Failure of Checks and Balances  
 
It has been noted that in times of national distress or external threat the so-called rally around 
the flag effect leads to the broadening of the power of the president (Skidmore, 2005:  222). 
Due to distress policy decision making authority moves up the echelons of government at the 
cost of a more consultative approach. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the Bush presidency 
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enjoyed unparalleled levels of support and the approval, 90% on the 21st of September 2001 
as the American public rallied around the flag (Belt, 2004: 1-2). 
 
According to Dahl in Belt (2004:2) a certain amount of loyal opposition is important to avoid 
tyranny and one of the reasons that the decision to wage war is left over to the U.S. Congress 
is that it is the most representative body in the U.S. political system and the public opinion 
has always been and important check on presidential power. Public opinion research has 
shown that the way a situation is framed and the analogies used is also of importance in 
framing public attitudes towards governmental policy (Belt, 2004: 5). 
 
Greider (2004: 11-13) makes the argument that The War on Terror is similar to the Cold War 
seeing that the adversary is depicted as omnipresent and not described in any resolute terms. 
In this way fear is created and maintained in the American psyche which influences the public 
opinion towards policy related to The War on Terror. This fear serves as constant justification 
for an ongoing pre-emptive set of wars collectively known as The War on Terror and related 
policy measures such as USA Patriot Act of 2001. The constant mobilization of American 
citizens and politician be it by physical, financial or especially by ideological means leads to 
democratic collapse within U.S. society where skepticism is weakness, silence is patriotic and 
admission of error is dishonorable.    
 
The War on Terror could therefore be described an ongoing situation with a constant rally 
around the flag effect where the loyal opposition and the checks and balances on policy issues 
related to The War on Terror such as the torture policy is not present. Bovard in Attention 
Deficit Democracy states that the government claimed absolute power – this claim has 
received little or no effective challenge (Bovard, 2005: 109).  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the focus shifted from a systemic model of how societies can provide approval 
and torturers for the torture process to how the U.S. government created the circumstances 
that fostered torture by means of policy decisions and legal means. By reinterpreting the 
torture question from why the U.S. government decided to how the torture policy could be 
enacted valuable insights were gained. In short it can be stated that the torture policy is an 
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emergent property of policy decision making without the usual checks and balances that the 
international community and civic democratic opposition provide. The absence of which 
made a theoretical policy possibility a real-world enacted policy. 
 
The root causes of this absence of checks and balances were also discussed. On the 
international level the unique role of the U.S. in the global post-Cold War political framework 
and the neo-conservative influence that bred military unilateralism was discussed. On the 
domestic level the permanent mobilization in American society led to a sustained rally 
around the flag effect where U.S. governmental power is neither checked nor balanced by 
civil society and therefore goes unchallenged. 
 
In the next chapter the lessons learnt from the previous two chapters will be used to 
investigate the effectiveness of current measures to stop the proliferation of torture and outline 
new measure that can effectively counter torture.  
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Chapter 5 – How to Stop Torture 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter the focus was on answering the question on why torture was used 
during the War on Terror even though torture is not an effective means of gathering 
actionable intelligence. It was found that the answer is a complex interaction between an 
array of different societal, psychological, historical, organizational and political factors. It was 
also found that the use of torture by the U.S. government is not an isolated event by any 
means but rather the continuation of human rights abuses. This analysis still left the last 
question on how these processes can be stopped unanswered. 
 
In this chapter present approaches such as legislation and monitoring as well as the use of 
torture warrants will be discussed. The amount of political will from the Obama 
administration that is necessary for these approaches to work will also be measured. Two 
additional approaches to stop torture by means of manufacturing political will are also 
discussed. Firstly, inquiries are discussed with reference to measures that are needed for its 
inception, history, its social function and limitations. The Church Committee of 1975 was 
successful under an uncannily similar set of circumstances faced today but over time there are 
limits to inquiries. The reason for this is that inquiries create political memories but they do 
not sustain it. Memorials as a supplementary step towards the maintenance of political 
memory will therefore also be discussed.   
 
5.2 Approaches to Torture and Why They Don’t Work 
 
The traditional approaches have always been legislation like the Geneva Convention of 1949 
or the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture and monitoring of detention 
facilities to investigate whether detainees are being treated in a humane manner. There have 
also been calls for the regulation of torture by means of warrants. The line of reasoning is that 
temporary and proper regulation and evaluation of results will create a body of knowledge 
that will conclude the torture debate one way or another (Rejali, 2007: 523-527). 
 
From the previous chapter one could notice how laws and regulations can be thwarted by 
means of intentionally misapplying the law. The U.S. foreign policy of unilateralism and their 
67 
 
unique role in the global order has the advantage of granting the U.S. immense policy 
autonomy vis-á-vis other states. Since this policy autonomy grants the U.S. the ability to work 
outside of the multilateral framework or be granted special privileges within it, which the 
Clinton-era customized definition of mental torture within the Geneva Convention is an 
example of, international regulations will not be an effective means of stopping the 
proliferation of torture if the U.S. political will to stop torture does not exist.  
 
Although monitoring has the advantage of scrutinizing whether abuses have occurred on a 
first-hand basis Rejali in Torture and Democracy notes that within the history of torture 
techniques there has been a distinct shift from what he calls scarring techniques to clean 
techniques that leaves no physical marks. This shift is due to the fact that clean techniques are 
still just as painful and damaging but are less likely to be noticed by monitors and judges. 
Democracies do this to ward off scandal and guarantee legitimacy for their political elite 
because human rights are one of the core values within democracies. It could therefore be said 
that monitoring has merely lead to the shift in technique, in democracies that do favour 
torture, from whipping and beating towards the usage of water boarding, sensor deprivation 
and electro torture (Rejali, 2007: 405-410). As in the case of the legislative approach to 
torture the lack of political will to stop torture can not be supplemented by means of 
monitoring.    
 
If governments believe that torture works they will keep on torturing until torture is proven 
not to work. The argument for the regulation of torture by means of warrants is based on the 
premise that the regulation of torture will diminish the secrecy surrounding torture and create 
enough information to prove whether torture works or not. It would also be possible to closely 
monitor the effect of torture on torturers (Rejali, 2007: 523-524).  
 
With relevance to torture warrants Rejali notes four distinct problems with torture before the 
inevitable conclusion that torture does not work is reached by means of the warrant approach: 
Firstly, historical research has shown that torture will start with a specified group like 
criminals about will eventually broaden in scope. This is especially so during wars of an 
asymmetrical nature where distinction between friend and foe are difficult to make. Secondly, 
especially when torture is used for informational purposes the time perceived time constraint 
and reluctance to give information from the detainee will lead to the breaching of prescribed 
techniques. Thirdly, the regulated institutionalization will eventually lead to the torturers 
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becoming a politicized faction in their own right (Rejali, 2007: 531-532). This will lead to a 
parallel administration of torture professionals that govern themselves and the inevitable loss 
of control over them. Historical examples include the Gestapo, the French in Algeria and the 
Americans in Central America. Fourthly governments are not likely to stop torture even 
though they know that it does not work. The reason for this is that using torture shows that 
pressured officials are willing to do anything at their disposal to do their job. As Rejali states: 
When a public official is prepared to spill the blood of a detained, helpless individual, 
breaking bonds of law and morality, this appears to satisfy a debt incurred by the violence of 
a terrorist. This sentiment is echoed by an active CIA agent: The larger problem with torture 
here, I think, is that this kind of stuff just makes people feel better (Rejali, 2007: 529-535).    
 
From the assessment of the most popular or debated approaches to counter or at least manage 
torture one will notice that none of them are effective when the political will to stop torture is 
absent. In the following section the stance taken towards torture by the Obama administration 
is investigated to infer the amount of political will in the present administration towards the 
stoppage of torture. 
 
 
5.3 The Obama Administration’s Level of Political Will to Stop Torture 
 
During his presidential campaign Obama was an outspoken critic of the Bush administration’s 
counterterrorism policies. Obama is quoted to have accused Bush of excessive secrecy, 
indefinite attention, warrantless wiretapping and enhanced interrogation techniques like 
simulated drowning that qualify as torture through any careful measure of the law or appeal 
to human decency. With regards to the CIA he affirmed that the CIA were governed by the 
same rules as the military and were not allowed to use techniques such as water boarding. 
According to Obama the interrogation programme should also be investigated (Gorman, 
2008).  
 
During the following presidential debate the moderator posed the question of whether a 
terrorist should be tortured if he has information of a ticking time bomb. Obama replied by 
stating that we cannot have the president of the United States as a matter of policy that there 
is a loophole or an exception where we would sanction torture … there are going to be all 
sorts of hypotheticals, an emergency situation, and I will make  that judgement at that time 
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(Schoenfeld, 2007). From this statement it could be seen that Obama is still granting himself 
freedom of policy movement when it comes to torture and is not categorically prohibiting the 
use of torture even though he does by political lip service to it (Schoenfeld, 2007). In a Wall 
Street Journal article an unnamed government official opined that Obama will possibly take a 
middle road with regards to the techniques the CIA is allowed to use but with greater 
oversight. This view is also shared by a former counterterrorism official in the Clinton and 
Bush administrations named Roger Cressey (Gorman, 2008). 
 
On the 22nd of January 2009 Obama signed an executive order called Ensuring Lawful 
Interrogations. This document ordered that facility at Guantanamo Bay should be closed 
within a year, that all black sites should be closed and that the Geneva Conventions should be 
applicable (Obama, 2009: 2 & 4). According to Prof. James Hill, a practicing lawyer, this 
executive order’s wording is of such a nature that torture could still take place under certain 
circumstances. Reasons for this include that the order only applies to armed conflicts and not 
to counterterrorism efforts and certain rulings only apply to the CIA and does not mention 
other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (Hill, 2009).  
  
On the 20th of April 2009 Obama stated, with relevance to the torture memorandums that were 
released by his administration four days earlier, that: For those who carried out some of these 
operations within the four corners of legal opinions or guidance that had been provided from 
the White House, I do not think it's appropriate for them to be prosecuted (Washington Post, 
2009).  Obama therefore feels that the CIA agents who trusted the legal opinion of the Bush 
administration should not be punished and that nothing will be gained by spending our time 
and energy laying blame for the past (Peter, 2009). The UN Special Rapporteur on torture 
Manfred Nowak, has stated that Obama’s stance might serve as a mitigating factor but he has 
called for an independent investigation into the abuses seeing that Obama’s intentions are not 
in accordance with the Geneva Convention and constitutes a breach of international law under 
the Nuremburg Principles (Peter, 2009) (McCoy, 2009). 
 
In reaction to this pressure from Nowak and a plea from congress that the likes of Alberto 
Gonzales, John Yoo, Jay Bybee and Steven Bradbury, who informed the torture policy 
decisions be prosecuted Obama went against his previous statement. On the 24th of August 
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2009 preliminary investigations have been launched that will focus on 10 cases were it is felt 
that interrogators even went beyond the broad legal limits set by the Office of Legal Council 
but not the Geneva Convention.  A special prosecutor, John H. Durham, has been named by 
Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate these cases (Peter, 2009) (Cohen, 2009) 
(Washington Post, 2009). Breaches of the Geneva Convention will thus not be investigated. 
 
During a confirmation testimony Obama’s nominees gave support for the CIA with regards to 
transferring prisoners to other countries without legal rights as well as indefinite detention of 
terrorism suspects. It was also mentioned that lawsuits by former detainees should be stopped 
to protect state secrets instead of withholding certain types of evidence. On the international 
front the British court was pressured by the Obama administration to not publish details on 
the alleged torture of a prisoner in U.S. custody. Afterwards the Obama administration 
thanked the British for its continued commitment to protect sensitive national security 
information (Savage, 2009). The CIA director, Leon Panetta had during his confirmation 
hearing stated that if approved interrogation techniques were not capable of producing 
information there would be asked for additional authority. Anthony Romero, the executive 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union, opined that this sequence of events might lead 
to the proliferation of some of the most problematic policies of the Bush presidency (Savage, 
2009). 
 
According to McCoy the Obama administration does not represent a stop of the torture policy 
but rather a return to the Cold War torture policy of outsourcing torture (McCoy, 2009). Allan 
Nairn observes that the Obama administration has not completely banned torture but has 
merely changed the way in which torture is administered. Obama has resorted to torture by 
proxy, the custom used since the Vietnam War of not using U.S. military or intelligence 
agencies for torture but rather sponsoring foreigners to administer it (Nairn, 2009). The Bush 
administration changed this modus operandi of torture to a more hands-on approach but with 
the following statement in his executive order: No individual currently detained at 
Guantánamo shall be held in the custody or under the effective control of any officer, 
employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or at a facility owned, operated, 
or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, except in conformity with all 
applicable laws governing the conditions of such confinement, including Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions (Obama, 2009:4) Obama has left the legal loophole open for torture 
by proxy. Nairn opines that what Obama is doing is that he is merely stopping the small 
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amount of torture by Americans but the majority of torture, done by foreign U.S. patrons, is 
left unscathed. This could even lead to an increase in torture (Nairn, 2009). By not taking 
responsibility the U.S. government is again setting itself up for the bipartisan torture policy of 
the Cold War. Human rights were seemingly supported but the covert way in which torture is 
outsourced, which has the advantage of producing plausible deniability for the U.S. will 
inevitably lead to another torture scandal (McCoy, 2009). 
 
Ali al-Fakhiri’s beter known as Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi eight-year torture interrogation and 
eventual suicide in a Libyan prison is very informative case study on this point. Al-Libi was 
regarded as the most important al-Qaeda member in U.S. custody. Pressure from the Bush 
administration on interrogators to prove a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq caused him to 
falsely state, while being tortured, that there was a direct link between al-Qaeda and the Iraq 
government. The impetus from the Bush administration was said not to focus on what he 
knew but using him to rationalize the war in Iraq (Macleod, 2009). 
 
Initially Al-Libi was under Pakistani custody. Under U.S. custody he was held in Bagram in 
Afghanistan then USS Bataan after this he was held at a secret location in Egypt Guantanamo 
Bay. With the planned closure of Guantanamo Bay al-Libi was put under Libyan custody in 
Abu Salim prison by the Bush administration (Macleod, 2009). This move is exemplary of the 
move by the Obama administration to let other intelligence agencies do their bidding as policy 
and laws are enacted that force the closure of secret black site prisons. Recently six al-Qaeda 
members were caught but were not extradited to the U.S. but were put under the custody of 
four Mid-East countries. The two highest-ranking al-Qaeda members since the inauguration 
of Obama are under Pakistani custody and not American custody. The new director of the 
CIA, Leon Panetta, has said that the CIA might continue its program of extraordinary 
rendition as long as there are guarantees of the humane treatment of the detainees (Mazzetti & 
Schmitt, 2009). Al-Libi’s suicide in Libya after eight years of imprisonment and during 
investigations into torture makes the timing of such a curious nature that the foreign 
guarantees posed by other states, that the Bush administration also relied on, should be 
questioned (Macleod, 2009) (Savage, 2009). 
 
5.4 Manufacturing Political Will  
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The Obama administration could be said to be in an extraordinarily powerful position with 
regards to torture. It could choose to adjudicate responsibility for what happen by means of an 
enquiry. Over and above this the Obama administration can take responsibility for how torture 
is regarded by future and present generations by shaping the collective memory when torture 
as policy measure is at its most salient but as Nairn (2009) points out: Obama could stop 
torture but he chooses not to.  
 
This poses considerable difficulty for a change in policy seeing that the U.S. president’s de 
jure and de facto veto authority on security policy matters deadlocks any change on policy. It 
is therefore important that a policy shift away from torture is orchestrated outside of the 
executive (Huq & Schwarz, 2007). In policy studies this is referred to as a bottom-up 
approach to policy. In section four of the third chapter there was a brief focus on the linkage 
between public attitudes and governmental policy and some of the different way in which it 
works. It was also found that the general American opinion on torture was ambivalent and 
that torture proliferates due to circumstance and psychological mechanisms common to all 
humans. These circumstances will cause the proposed bottom-up policy change plan to be 
ineffective except if the American populace can be educated about the ineffectiveness and 
dangers of torture as foreign policy and by means of the linkages between public opinion and 
governmental policy put a stop to the use of torture as foreign policy instrument. In this way 
political will will be manufactured by means of the general populace.  
 
McCoy notes that this cyclic use of torture as foreign policy is characterized by firstly 
blaming a few bad apples and then arguing that torture leads helps keep the U.S. secure and 
lastly calling for national unity by stating that we need to move forward together as the 
Obama administration is doing now. The cases of U.S. torture in Vietnam (1970), Brazil 
(1974), Iran (1978), Honduras (1988) and in Latin America (1997) also fell under the public 
scrutiny but lack of action allowed torture to proliferate further. This time around outsourcing 
torture to other countries will most probably not protect the Obama administration as much as 
other forms of political insulation have helped to protect previous American administration 
from torture’s backlash seeing that the U.S. use of torture has garnered unmatched levels of 
attention both locally and internationally since Abu Ghraib. Unless some formal inquiry is 
convened to look into a sordid history that reached its depths in the Bush era, and so begins 
to break this cycle of deceit, exposé and paralysis followed by more of the same, we're likely, 
a few years hence, to find ourselves right back where we are now. We'll be confronted with 
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the next American torture scandal from some future iconic dungeon, part of a dismal, ever 
lengthening procession that has led from the tiger cages of South Vietnam through the Shah 
of Iran's prison cells in Tehran to Abu Ghraib and the prison at Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan (McCoy, 2006). 
 
An inquiry into torture is therefore of the utmost importance. The reason being is that the 
American history of torture is a contested idea. The way in which the recent torture debacle is 
framed makes the general public believe that this is an isolated event that does not need to be 
addressed seeing that it will not happen again and is not due to an ingrained policy process. 
This constitutes an abuse of history and should be addressed while torture is still a salient 
topic seeing that how this episode of torture is ingrained in the American political memory 
will depend on whether torture will be used as a foreign policy measure or not. If the abuses 
of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are seen as seen as isolated events and that torture is 
necessary to secure the safety of the U.S. then torture will proliferate again (McCoy, 2009). 
 
This is especially so seeing that the Obama administration has reverted to the previous Cold 
War tactic of exporting torture to other countries. By doing this all promises of not using 
torture will not last (McCoy, 2009). On the other hand if these cases are judged to be the 
emergent property of a combination between a historical precedent, set 50 years ago, and a 
specific set of circumstances then it will be possible to stop the proliferation of torture by 
means of framing the torture debate in the correct manner by means of a formal inquiry. If 
done correctly this inquiry will affect the American perception towards torture in such a 
manner that torture will not be able to proliferate again. 
 
5.5 The Church Committee as Historic U.S. Example of Inquiries 
 
Although the systemic use of torture during The War on Terror arguably represents the most 
institutionally condoned form of human rights abuses, since slavery, in American history it 
does have a very similar historical precedent. This precedent was rationalized by the fight 
against communism and substantiated by means of political rhetoric such as: It is now clear 
that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by 
whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable 
norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing 
American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered which carries an uncanny resemblance 
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of the Dick Cheney’s statement of working through the dark side in the fight against terrorism 
(Hayes, 2009). 
 
In a 1974 exposé for the New York Times Seymour Hersh reported on the covert activities of 
the U.S. executive branch’s agencies including the CIA, FBI and NSA. On the international 
front the U.S. government tried to overthrow the government in Chile, hire the Mafia to 
assassinate Fidel Castro and ordered the assassination of Patrice Lumumba of Congo by 
means of bio toxins. On the local front they tried to force Martin Luther King to commit 
suicide by sending him tapes of himself and his mistress with the message: There is but one 
way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the 
nation (Hayes, 2007). They tested LSD on unsuspecting members of society, which resulted 
in the death of a civilian. As well as impeached on the fundamental rights to privacy and 
freedom of association by reading every telegraph sent to or from the US for more 30 years 
and surveying civil rights leaders and political activists during Operation Chaos (Hayes, 
2009) (Huq & Hayes, 2007). 
 
In reaction to these allegations the Senate launched The Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This committee, 
colloquially and henceforth known as The Church Committee found that Domestic 
Intelligence Activity Has Threatened and Undermined The Constitutional Rights of Americans 
to Free Speech, Association and Privacy. It Has Done So Primarily Because The 
Constitutional System for Checking Abuse of Power Has Not Been Applied (The Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1976). 
 
Additionally the Church Committee stated that the loss of checks and balances, that made the 
actions of the U.S. intelligence community feasible was resultant of the circumstances (the 
perceived communist threat) that lead to the centralization of power in the executive, the 
freedom of intelligence agencies to wield power on an unchecked basis, the misuse of secrecy 
in intelligence affairs and the active avoidance of the rule of  law (The Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1976). From the 
previous chapter it should be noted that this dissertation’s analysis of torture as a policy 
instrument matches the findings of the Church Committee on a point for point basis. The 
Church Committee temporarily succeeded in curtailing the U.S. intelligence community by 
installing relevant policy measures and appropriate oversight mechanisms. 
75 
 
 
 
5.5.1 Inquiries – Conditions for Inception 
 
After Maher Arar, a Canadian and Syrian citizen was extradited to Syria and tortured for a 
year a Canadian commission of enquiry was launched due to sustained media pressure. The 
commission found that Canadian intelligence produced false information that lead to his 
extradition, torture and him eventually signing a false confession. The Canadian government 
officially apologized and Arat was financially compensated. This was one of the first 
instances where governments took responsibility for the consequences of participation in the 
War on Terror (Macklin, 2008: 12). 
 
Arar’s wife, Monia Mazigh’s, decision to put Ara’s ordeal in the public domain and run a well 
managed media campaign on his behalf was on of the reasons why Arar’s rendition and 
torture were eventually investigated by a commission. This serves to show that public and 
media pressure are essential for getting human rights abuses to be investigated by 
governments (Macklin, 2008: 19).The fact that the Canadian government was under the rule 
of separate political parties during the rendition and the investigation also played a role into 
the investigation (Macklin, 2008: 20).  
 
The role of the media, civil society and the international in applying sustained political 
pressure on the Obama administration can force the creation of a commission that will not 
only investigate ten cases that are only investigate breaches of the Office of Legal Council’s 
memorandums but also the wholes chain of command can therefore not be understated. In the 
American case it can be said that the change in political parties could also have a positive 
effect on the chances of a commission of enquiry but Obama reluctance to look at the past 
might be highly detrimental to this effort. The establishment of an inquiry into the use of 
torture to manufacture the political will not to torture can therefore be said to be the media 
and human rights group’s responsibility. 
 
 
5.5.2 Inquiries – Social Functions & Limitations 
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An inquiry is a mechanism of addressing the wrongful deeds of public officials. The inquiry is 
independent of the government and although judges preside over them they are not trials. This 
means that commissions do not sentence officials although commissions are authorized to do 
fact-finding and launch investigations that can then be used in trials. Policy recommendations 
will also be made such as oversight mechanisms for intelligence agencies such as in the case 
of the Church Commission. Commissions also serve the important social function of 
informing the general public what exactly happened during a troublesome event (Macklin, 
2008: 22).  
 
In this way an inquiry serves the purpose of making what happened part of the political 
memory. In most instances remembrance is not a natural process but it lies open to political 
influence and ruling regimes makes us of history in such a way that it serves as a strategic 
resource (Knauer & Walkowitz, 2004: 4 & 189) seeing that the understanding of the past has 
important political consequences (Hodgkin & Radstone, 2003: 1). In relation to torture and 
commission of inquiry political influence can be achieved in several ways: The further 
proliferation of torture will can be achieved by intentionally prolonging the commission. In 
that way public scrutiny will be diverted until public interest on the matter starts to wane 
(Macklin, 2008:14). Another matter investigating intelligence organizations is the fact that the 
function of generating publicity if the correct facts pertaining to a troublesome event are that 
some of the information should be kept confidential for national security purposes (Macklin, 
2008: 22). The rationalization affirms that full disclosure of the facts during a commission 
will inevitably lead to a breach in national security seeing that the information is of such as 
sensitive type and should therefore not be made public knowledge. This prolongs the time 
between the abuses and the inquiry itself which will lead to further difficulties in ascertaining 
the truth. Proponents of torture in America have also tried to rid themselves of responsibility 
by means of destroying evidence seeing that the CIA has already destroyed 92 interrogation 
videotapes in anticipation of an inquiry (McCoy, 2009). 
 
The perception that torture is an effective means of gathering intelligence is exceptionally 
troublesome for the establishment of an inquiry although chapter one has proven it limited 
utility. This view is purported by the politicians that have been shown to have supported the 
used of advanced interrogation techniques. The newest example of which are the two much 
anticipated CIA memorandums that were declassified on the 24th of August 2009 after an 
extended campaign by the former vice-president Dick Cheney. The memorandums, that are 
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heavily censored, do not prove that advanced interrogation techniques work although they are 
said to do so. Tom Parker, the policy director of Amnesty International America opined that: 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Vice President Cheney’s track record, the two CIA memos 
released today are hardly the slam dunk we had been led to expect.  There is little or no 
supporting evidence in either memo to give substance to the specific claims about impending 
attacks made by Khaled Shaik Mohammed in highly coercive circumstances (Ackerman, 
2009).  
 
The reason for purporting the alleged utility of torture is quite logical. Admittance of a 
mistake of this magnitude would be tantamount to admitting to a gross violation of human 
rights and would make the perpetrators liable to criminal investigations. One of the reasons 
that torture is therefore still used in democracies is the fact that the perception that it works 
serves certain individual’s political interests and protects their liberty. This perpetration of 
obscure justifications of why torture is integral to counter terrorism also has the added effect 
that it appeases the public into silence seeing nobody will actively work  against something if 
they assume that it is important for their safety. In actual fact a U.S. major who makes use of 
rapport-based techniques has reported that many of the new al-Qaeda recruits come to al-
Qaeda because they have heard of the human rights abuses that have been done at Abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo (Cockburn, 2009).     
 
The Church committee temporarily succeeded in stopping the misuse of power by the CIA by 
means of creating oversight mechanisms for intelligence organizations such as the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence but 
within only two decades have these regulations have been misused to proliferate torture, for 
example, by means of the misuse of the presidential Group of Eight privileges under the 
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 (Hayes, 2009) (Mazetti & Shane: 2009). This is not to say 
that the Church Committee was unsuccessful but rather to state that these forms of enquiry 
only go half way in eradicating the social malaise which they address seeing that their primary 
social function is to get to the truth surrounding a certain matter and inform policy 
surrounding it (Macklin, 2008: 22). The use of torture is a cyclic phenomenon in American 
politics and committees to not operate as watch dogs over policy or help in sustaining the 
needed public and political attention torture will resurface as it has in the past. Commissions 
therefore create the political memory but they do not sustain it. 
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5.6 Monuments and War Memorials - Additional Measures to Stop Torture 
 
What is needed in addition to a committee is a measure that will make the use of torture and 
the correct sequence of events part of the American society’s political memory on a sustained 
basis. Monuments fulfils the purpose of being sources of collective memory (Knauer & 
Walkowitz, 2004: 189) and they address a country’s political history. Most importantly they 
tell us that the moment we become unwilling to do the actions that an idea entails, at that 
moment the idea dies: It becomes a form, a thing to be paid lip service, or a target of 
cynicisms (Mayo, 1988: 74-75). This is especially true in the case of torture throughout the 
last 50 years of American history. The use of torture has not formed part of the political 
memory of Americans and through a type of forgetfulness torture has proliferated and even 
got institutionalized while human rights has only been paid lip service to by politicians.  
 
Memorials are an ideal way of dealing with political forgetfulness in relation to human rights 
issues seeing that the social purpose that memorials serve are the declaration of the complete 
hierarchy of human values such as identity, service, honour and humanitarianism in ascending 
order. Humanitarianism is the highest social purpose of memorials seeing that it not only 
serves a way of remembering wars but also as a way of questioning it and its means. In this 
sense memorials that represent humanitarianism serves as a reminder of the cultivation of 
humanity. Examples of these are the preservation of prison camps and sites of massacres than 
counter inhumanity with humanity. These types of memorials serves the whole spectrum of 
human values seeing that it states that something of importance happened, a service is done 
by educating present and future generations, honour is bestowed on victims and above all 
humanitarianism is expressed by pleading that inhumanity should not be forgotten and should 
not be allowed to be repeated (Mayo, 1988: 64-67).  
 
It is therefore of the utmost importance that the findings of the commission be as accurate as 
possible and that the maximum possible amount of disclosure is achieved so that the 
American public will know exactly what the memorial represents because a particular purpose 
and sentiment provides meaning to memorials while memorials reciprocally reinforce and 
sustain the values and goals that correspond to the sentiment (Mayo, 1988: 62-64). 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter’s focus was an investigation into possible approaches to stop the proliferation of 
torture. Although approaches such as legislation, monitoring exist and other measures such as 
warrants are debated the fact still stands that all these measures are of questionable utility 
without the existence of political will. The Obama administration’s stance towards torture 
serves as an indication of the amount of political will to sop the use of torture. In the present 
absence of political will policy against torture should be done by means of a bottom-up 
approach of manufacturing political will. Seeing that the political will to stop torture is not 
present and the American public is ambivalent about the use of torture the onus falls on the 
free press, civil society organizations and the international community to manufacture the 
necessary political will. 
 
 
Recommendations were made based on the previous successes of the Church committee that 
addressed a similar set of circumstances. The utility of inquiries were shown to be that 
inquiries are capable of investigating a matter of public interest on an independent basis and 
inform the public. The one shortcoming of inquiries is that they create the political memory 
but they do not sustain it. By not sustaining a political memory the U.S. government and 
citizenry are bound to make the same mistake again seeing that the use of torture is a cyclic 
phenomenon. It was found that one way in which political memory can be sustained is by 
means of memorials that reflect and sustain the sentiment that torture is a futile practice that 
should not be attempted.      
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6. Concluding and Evaluative Chapter 
 
Chapter 2 – The Limited utility of Torture has proven that torture is not an effective means of 
gathering intelligence outside of the narrow theoretical confines of the seductive ticking time 
bomb argument. It was found that two sets of reasons exist for this. Firstly, in practical terms 
the dynamics of torture was shown to be of such a nature that it will not necessarily lead to 
truthful information due to psychological and physiological reasons. Secondly, torture does 
not exist within an institutional vacuum and was shown to have extremely hazardous effects 
on the medical and psychological professions, the judiciary, torturers, intelligence gathering 
institutions, the military, society, democracy and the international rule of law. The Limited 
utility of Torture ends by posing the first research question of how torture can still used in 
modern democracies even though torture is known to be an ineffective means of gathering 
intelligence.  
 
This abovementioned research question was partly answered in Chapter 3 – The Social Model 
of Torture where the U.S. societal dynamics in relation to torture was examined. It found that 
the American public opinion towards torture is ambivalent and that the American public also 
falls for the seductiveness of the torture argument in the guise of the ticking time bomb 
argument. Practical reasons for this include low levels of knowledge about events surrounding 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Social-psychological reasons for this include the 
in-group out group bias, just world thinking, the resemblance criterion, the availability 
heuristic and the War on Terror as political ideology. From the analysis of the supply of 
torturers it was found that anybody is likely to torture if the correct circumstances are in place. 
The role of legitimate authority and group dynamics was found to be important circumstantial 
factors as illustrated by means of the Milgram’s Obedience Experiment and the Stanford 
Prison Experiment. 
 
The second part of the answer to the first research question is treated in Chapter 4 – The 
Systems Political Model of Torture which focuses on the political process surrounding the 
decision to use torture as foreign policy measure. It finds that although the events of 9/11 and 
the threat caused by al-Qaeda did play an important role in making torture part of U.S. foreign 
policy the U.S. government has extensively used torture in the past and this is not their first 
81 
 
foray into torture. By examining the ways in which torture was made part of U.S. foreign 
policy it is illustrated that the use of torture was a decision at the top echelons of government 
and that this decision was made possible by the failure of international and domestic checks 
and balances. On the international front U.S. unilateralism in the post-cold war political 
system and the political ideology of the neo-conservatives are cited as reasons for this 
decision. On the domestic level a constant rally around the flag effect caused by the War on 
Terror has led to unquestioned governmental power by means of the disappearance of the so-
called loyal opposition. 
 
Chapter 5 – How to Stop Torture answers the second research question of what can be done to 
stop the use of torture by means of using the lessons learnt in the previous chapters. It finds 
that traditional approaches such as monitoring and legislation are not effective means of 
stopping the use of torture if the political will to stop using torture does not exist. The amount 
of political will needed to put a stop to torture in was found to be lacking in the Obama 
administration. This led to a discussion on ways in which political will can be manufactured 
by the international community, free press and civil society organizations by applying 
political pressure for the inception of a commission that will bring all the relevant facts about 
the U.S. use of torture as foreign policy instrument to light. A historic analysis of the Church 
Commission has shown commissions to be effective in stopping human rights abuses by fact-
finding and creating the political memory. One of the shortcomings of commissions was 
found to be that they do not sustain this political memory and over time these abuses start 
again albeit in a slightly different form. The argument is then made that a monument or war 
memorial in conjunction with a commission will stop torture by reminding the American 
public of its futility on a permanent basis. 
 
6.1 Aim and Main Findings of the Study 
 
The aim of the study was to investigate why torture is still used even when it was found that 
torture is not an effective means of gathering intelligence and what can be done to stop its use. 
It was found that beyond the narrow theoretical confines of the ticking time bomb argument 
that torture is not an effective means of gathering information and that competent 
interrogators prefer rapport-based techniques. The reasons for this is that a host of 
psychological and physiological reasons exist that causes the use of torture not to lead to the 
truth surrounding an intelligence matter. It was also found that torture does not operate within 
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an institutional vacuum and that torture also has an adverse effect on a wide array of 
institutions. 
 
From the societal perspective it was found that the American public opinion was constantly 
ambivalent towards torture although they support laws against human rights abuse. This 
ambiguity was found to be caused by the ticking time bomb argument and social-
psychological reasons such as the in-group out-group bias and just world thinking. The role of 
the War on Terror as political ideology was also found to be of importance in influencing 
American public opinion. Political policy making and public opinion was also shown to be 
connected in a multitude of ways. It was also discovered that depending on the circumstances 
any person can become a torturer. 
 
It was found that the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay was not the work of few bad 
apples but formed part of a deliberative and historic governmental process to make torture a 
legitimate part of U.S. foreign policy. This political decision was caused by means of the 
failure of checks and balances. On an international level the checks and balances fell away 
due to U.S. unilateralism in their foreign policy. On an domestic level the democratic checks 
and balances fell away due to a permanent rally around the flag effect brought on by means of 
permanent mobilization due to the War on Terror. 
 
The traditional approaches towards torture were found to be ineffective without the necessary 
political will to stop torture. This very political will is lacking in the Obama administration 
and the only means of completely stopping torture in the American case study as by means of 
manufacturing political will. Political will can be manufactured by means of an in-depth 
inquiry into the U.S. use of torture and the erection of a monument to make the atrocities and 
a willingness to stop it part of the U.S. political memory.   
 
6.2 Success of the Research Methodology 
 
Although the research methodology could be described as a success in terms of the systematic 
literature review the case study approach taken to the use of torture ca be said to be 
problematic when used without due caution. The reason for this is that the case study focused 
almost exclusively on the U.S. use of torture. Seeing that the U.S. government has a unique 
function in the world political system the lessons learnt and suggestions that where made are 
probably not wholly applicable to other democracies that use torture. These lessons and 
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suggestions should therefore be applied with caution when used on other cases seeing that 
findings from case studies can not be applied without further analysis. 
 
 
6.3 Lessons Learnt  
 
At first it was believed that the use of torture by the Bush administration was an emergent 
property of the situational circumstances of a post 9/11 United States. The work of McCoy 
(2009) was instrumental in displaying that the U.S. government has relied on torture on a 
systematic basis for the past 50 years. This information also led to discovery of this historic 
tendency within the Obama administration.  
 
Torture was also shown to be a very complex and dangerous problem that requires a cross-
disciplinary focus. The lack of a unified theory surrounding torture is very problematic and 
academics should make themselves available for a collaborative study of torture. The notion 
that torture works or can be condoned under certain circumstances slows the rate of progress 
towards this effort to stop the use of torture on a permanent basis by dividing academic and 
policy makers in two different camps.  
 
In stopping the human rights abuses the importance of civil society, the free press and the 
international community was shown to be of immense importance. The main lesson of this 
dissertation could therefore be said to be that active participation in civil society within 
democratic states is not a luxury but a responsibility.  
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